Re:Heartbleed disclosure timeline: who knew what and when
by makomk on Tuesday April 15, 2014 @05:15AM
(#7590986)
I'd actually released code to get private keys a day or two before Cloudflare wrote that blog post on the principle that it was easy enough to do that numerous other people probably already had in private. Didn't help; people still kept concluding that it was impossible to get the private key. Cloudflare were the most publicity-hungry by a little but they weren't the only offender; ErrataSec screwed up pretty badly too for example, as did Akamai and I think one or two others.
Re:Heartbleed disclosure timeline: who knew what and when
by bredren on Monday April 14, 2014 @11:02PM
(#7590111)
The last time I saw a company leverage marketing in this way was when Silent Circle shut down their 4 month old email product in a well-publicized 'stand of solidarity' with lavabit. People didn't really care as much about that one.
It really pissed me off because I developed the ability to get keys long before you even wrote the post. I commented about it here several days before you wrote the post[1]. After your blog post, I was accused of fabricating the entire story because you said keys were unobtainable. I cannot, legally, release code without opening myself up to legal ramifications for reasons I won't get into here. Then, after your post, people I've known for a long time accused me of making the entire thing up for a "shot at glory." Meanwhile, I had to explain that your blog post was not definitive to multiple people who were reassured by the false security.
I brought your company's marketing strategy up with you before on HN. Remember when your company jumped on nytimes.com getting owned at the registrar[0]? And you wrote a hurried postmortem of events (I'm assuming, from the typos) without even consulting the affected vendor, then went so far as to speculate on what happened at the affected vendor, and made sure your "postmortem" got on top of HN first?
> An e-mail obtained by Matther [sic] Key, an independant [sic] journalist, indicates that the hackers used a MelbourneIT domain reseller account as part of the attack. While we are only speculating at this point, it's possible that there was a vulnerability in Melbourne IT's reseller systems that allowed a privilege escalation.
You replied here on HN with "no good deed goes unpunished" after I expressed my displeasure with your company's behavior in that scenario, and you didn't really address my points. You basically pointed to the CTO of NYT's praise of your company as evidence enough that you did the right thing. You took advantage of the marketing opportunity (which is fine, I don't fault you) at the expense of allowing the affected vendor to even draft a postmortem or contact customers in a timely fashion (I fault you for that).
We get it. You want to position CloudFlare as a superhero company, capable of fixing the Internet problems that the rest of us cannot handle. However, your marketing strategy has alienated me from ever using your services, and I am not alone in that opinion. Please, rethink that strategy. Focus on the product instead of fixing what you perceive to be a broken Internet that only you can fix. That's the obvious tone I get from your marketing and choices of venue.
[0]: http://blog.cloudflare.com/details-behind-todays-internet-ha...
[1]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7551915