Re:Distrusting StartSSL
by guan on Saturday April 12, 2014 @05:15PM
(#7579237)
This is all kind of pointless for my silly personal blog, so you could view it as a symbolic way of registering my displeasure with StartCom ;-)
To answer your question, suppose I think my key has been compromised. Then I don’t want to continue using that key because non-MITM’ed communication between my server and the client is compromised. So I generate a new key, and I’d like a a new certificate for that new key—the old one won’t work (Apple Secure Transport bug notwithstanding). My users are still vulnerable to a MITM attack, yes.
--edit: assuming that the user’s connection uses a non-PFS cipher suite.
Re:Distrusting StartSSL
by guan on Sunday April 13, 2014 @09:13AM
(#7581206)
To put it more succinctly: my private key has potentially been compromised, not my certificate. By generating a new private key (which implies a new certificate), I can protect against non-MITM eavesdropping for non-PFS ciphers.
To answer your question, suppose I think my key has been compromised. Then I don’t want to continue using that key because non-MITM’ed communication between my server and the client is compromised. So I generate a new key, and I’d like a a new certificate for that new key—the old one won’t work (Apple Secure Transport bug notwithstanding). My users are still vulnerable to a MITM attack, yes.
--edit: assuming that the user’s connection uses a non-PFS cipher suite.