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Re:OpenSSL vulnerable to timing attack? by dragonwriter on Thursday April 10, 2014 @08:01PM (#7570461)
> What kind of connection is fast enough to detect the difference of a single loop iteration inside memcmp()?

Any, really, if you hit it with enough copies of each potential input so that you can get enough results to separate the timing difference from the noise. Though the faster, the more samples you can do per unit time, and the closer in network topology, the less sources of variability in latency that make it take more samples you'll have. At least, that's my understanding.

Re:OpenSSL vulnerable to timing attack? by tptacek on Friday April 11, 2014 @11:44AM (#7573558)
No, there's a threshold below which you can't effectively distinguish noise from signal even with many samples; theoretically, you can try to overcome this problem with more samples, but there are practical limits, and often actual constraints on the number of samples you can collect and the window of time you have to collect them.

Read Crosby and Wallach's "Opportunities and Limits" paper; the shorthand result of the paper is that across Ethernet you have a window of 100ns, and across an IP network something closer to 30us. The memcmp distinguisher is well below the IP network threshold.