I made a patch to ruby swapping the memcmp for CRYPTO_memcmp, which should be constant-time. I'm checking to see that I didn't break the build, after which I'll make a pull request to https://github.com/ruby/ruby. Then it'll be up to the ruby developers, who probably have better insight into this than me, to accept or decline it.
EDIT: For anyone interested: https://github.com/ruby/ruby/pull/591
Yeah, I'm thinking it's dead code. It's not exposed in modern OpenSSLs, and I can't find any services we use (Pure-FTP, httpd, etc) that use this function.
OpenSSL devs should probably remove this code.
It looks like there's some github projects using it: https://github.com/search?q=SSL_SESSION_cmp&ref=cmdform&type...
Re:OpenSSL vulnerable to timing attack?
by petermalone on Thursday April 10, 2014 @08:13PM
(#7570506)
The current version of Android also uses it.
Link?
Re:OpenSSL vulnerable to timing attack?
by petermalone on Friday April 11, 2014 @06:29AM
(#7572091)
It's marked as static and isn't used anywhere there, so it's not an issue: they have an up-to-date version of upstream OpenSSL.
Re:OpenSSL vulnerable to timing attack?
by petermalone on Friday April 11, 2014 @06:31PM
(#7575981)
Ah - good to know. Cheers!
I think it's probably a piece of dead code at this point, but there might be some legacy stuff using it (with an old version of OpenSSL), which could lead to a vulnerability. Regardless, the function should probably be rewritten or removed.
EDIT: It looks like the latest version of Ruby (MRI) actually copied this function from OpenSSL so they could keep using it: https://github.com/ruby/ruby/blob/1aa54bebaf274bc08e72f9ad38...