However, there are gotchas. At this point the TLS protocol has gotten pretty complex. Even the act of just stating what the desired security property are is not simple. Furthermore, understanding what their proof means requires you to go through at least two of their papers (and probably both of their tech reports to grok it fully). Then you need to look at the code itself and the different assertions/assumptions spread throughout, and make sure that those conform to the properties you expect. Even if you are familiar with the field, starting from scratch would probably take you a couple of weeks, just to gain confidence that what they prove is correct. And it might be possible that there are some features of TLS that they don't implement (as you can tell, I haven't taken the couple of weeks to fully understand their stuff).
This says nothing about how secure it is with respect to side-channel attacks. For example, they admit that they did not model time in their proofs, so they have NOT proved that they are immune to timing attacks. Moreover, F# runs on top of the unverified CLI--bugs in the CLI can be used to break miTLS.
However, the nice thing about having a verified implementation is that it can be used as the specification (reference implementation) for any other optimisations you want to make.
Such a two-step process is usually much more tractable than trying to verify optimised code directly. This is used extensively by BedRock ( http://plv.csail.mit.edu/bedrock/ ) which uses functional programs as specifications and an assembly-like language for the "real"/optimised implementation. The resulting verification problems are straightforward enough to be mostly automated.
As for Mono or .NET, I assume so (AFAIK that's the only way to run F# applications).
(disclosure - I work for IBM, though not in cloud infrastructure. What I say for Amazon applies to our cloud services guys too.)
NSS, which is used by Mozilla and Chrome. For Apache, just google mod_nss or read this: https://stomp.colorado.edu/blog/blog/2010/06/04/on-setting-u...
It looks like NSS isn't supported on nginx. Hope somebody puts that on their todo list!
There are other issues as well; not blocking problems necessarily, but reasons why it might not be a great implementation or why it would break the way current SSL works for distro maintainers and users.
One case do not make a trend at all, and two cases is the worst statistical proof there is for trends.
On the positive side, open source model of development do allow projects to use not only what is common, but also the exciting fronter regarding security models. My project has used gnutls with pgp for 6 years now, nicely avoiding all those 2 major vulnerabilities, and that was only possible because someone found themselves wanting to implement the new TLS standard that supported pgp keys.
Sadly, it'll never become popular because of the license.
But blizzard must be one of those small companies that do not care about profits, or have no lawyers. No "serious company" or serious software would dare to use LGPL, right?
But instead of arguing license religion, I suggest we move back to the topic of OpenSSL and vulnerabilities.
But yes, let's go back to lamenting the state of crypto libraries, we can at least agree on that.
A publisher hires a studio to make a game, which then gets published on platforms that actively prevent users from (compiling and) running their own software (consoles, iOS).
Since the user is not provided with the tools to replace a library used in a game, the terms of the LGPL cannot be met even if the studio were to release the source to their version of the library.
In fact, even if they released the source to their whole game (something the publisher would never allow) the LGPLv3 still cannot be met because of the anti-Tivoisation clause, which stipulates that users must be able to run their own compiled version of the software.
Also, I think the the user isn't prevented from recompiling and running altogether; a user can get a developer account. Although, I guess that presents an additional cost, something (L)GPL might be against.
I doubt very much that RMS would want to add such a clause. Remember, the GPL and LGPL are political tools as much as software licences. They exist to move the world in a certain direction. Adding such clauses would reduce their reason for existing.
If the library is statically linked (which is the case at least on consoles), the user would also need the game's source code. I think the restriction is enough to trigger the (L)GPL clauses anyway.
Tivo would just create a complicated enough corporate structure to provide the same shroud for themselves and will then be able to satisfy all requirements.
if you try to reverse engineer the protocol starcraft 2 uses with battlenet, you will have a hard time arguing in court that the LGPL license gives you permission to do so. If I recall right, starcarft 2 has some heavy restrictions on reverse engineering for this specific purpose, and I trust their lawyers to actually understand this difference.
For console games (which starcraft 2 is not), the console environment is incompatible with LGPL. If adaption of a security library depend on the console market, then such adaption won't happen.
I think what might be happening here is expert syndrome. People may be told that if they're not experts then they shouldn't be reviewing or changing the code.
http://c2.com/cgi/wiki?ConceptualIntegrity
This is pretty much a must for any project where there is more than one person working, and the more people contributing or the more mission-critical the project the more of this kind of high-level coordination is required. Some open source projects with strong leadership do get to this kind of integrity, but most don't. It's easier when there is a relatively small team of very dedicated individuals, but some large projects have succeeded to some extent in building a real development culture in an open source setting, like Linux.
back in 2010, my business partner, marco peereboom, submitted a patch to openssl to add support for aes-xts. it was coded by joel sing, now a google employee and golang dev. they _didn't even respond to the mailing list email_ and after marco nagged for a reply the response was "we have a different plan for how to implement XTS" (i'm paraphrasing). _2 years later_, they added XTS support.
the openssl dev team is not responsive, doesn't accept contributions and generally speaking suffers from "you're not an expert" syndrome. look how expertly they've managed their project!
I'd love to contribute more often to other OSS projects. But this behavior is more common than not.
My conclusion was that the OpenSSL project is not interested in external contributions.
[1]: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg3362...
This has not been my experience. I've contributed to many different projects, large and small (chpasswd, sendmail, apache, git, gerrit, openconnect, homebrew, msmtp, textmate, ...) and never had trouble getting a patch accepted.
edit: downvotes, really?
There may be some bug in a library that's similar to what I do for my day job, and I spot it immediately. Or perhaps I've seen the inevitable results of certain design decisions play out in multiple organizations.
I may not have time to code up a patch. Frankly, I've got about 5 projects on the go besides work and kids.
So, FOSS projects may lose out on that kind of expertise that could easily be crowd-sourced if it didn't ask so much of contributors.
"D. Richard Hipp designed SQLite in the spring of 2000 while working for General Dynamics on contract with the United States Navy.[7] Hipp was designing software used on board guided missile destroyers" -- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sqlite#History
There is a lot of work in crypto research about trust in the logical and mathematical sense, why is this work not applied to software testing at least for infrastructure crypto?
P.S. By way of incentivizing this work... seems like a pretty good dissertation topic.
Well, if they did care more, you'd see engineers from Intel, IBM, et. al., contributing to the project in droves like they do with the Linux kernel.
Perhaps the open source model of development is just not very good for software of this kind. Of course it's good that the source is open for everyone to look and potentially contribute, but without funding and without having a real process and a full time team it seems to me it is hard to get the level of quality required.
I also wonder how much in the end the big institutions care about this stuff. Intel hires a bunch of guys to do formal models of their processors to ensure bugs aren't shipped to millions of customers, why is nobody funding a formally specified version of SSL? For other mission critical systems, like what goes into spacecrafts, or hospitals, or gets developed in the military there are rigorous processes in use to prevent stupid mistakes, so it's somewhat disappointing that the major infrastructure pieces don't receive this kind of treatment.