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Re:Chrome/Firefox aren't checking CA revocation lists by tzs on Tuesday April 08, 2014 @11:23PM (#7557513)
> In order to attack an HTTPS connection, the attacker has to have MITM position against the victim: the ability to intercept TCP connections.

> Such an attacker can obviously also block the CRL/OCSP lookup if one is made.

This is not at all obvious to me. Suppose you wanted to steal credit cards. The best place to do your MITM would be at the payment processor's connection to the net.

The clients doing the CRL/OSCP lookup will be connecting to the certificate authority, not the payment processor, for this. The MITM won't see them in most cases.

People who do their MITM close to the client can probably stop CRL/OSCP lookup, of course.

Re:Chrome/Firefox aren't checking CA revocation lists by agl on Wednesday April 09, 2014 @12:33AM (#7557650)
> Suppose you wanted to steal credit cards. The best place to do your MITM would be at the payment processor's connection to the net.

In that situation the attacker can pass DV checks as the server and so can get new certificates issued to themselves. Or maybe they stock up on certificates before attacking and use OCSP stapling to run out 7 days per certificate.

Basically, everything falls apart in that situation already.