Re:Chrome/Firefox aren't checking CA revocation lists
by agl on Tuesday April 08, 2014 @09:41PM
(#7557237)
We did this by mistake once and got bug reports about PayPal being flakey. (PayPal was an early HSTS adopter.)
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Re:Chrome/Firefox aren't checking CA revocation lists
by fastest963 on Tuesday April 08, 2014 @10:26PM
(#7557362)
Understandable, admins would just have to start treating OCSP like they do DNS (if it fails you can't visit site).
Re:Chrome/Firefox aren't checking CA revocation lists
by derefr on Wednesday April 09, 2014 @02:27PM
(#7561256)
A thought: given that admins already have something that they treat like DNS--which is to say, DNS--could certificate revocations be distributed as DNS TXT records, and thus reuse all the caching infrastructure DNS currently implies?
Re:Chrome/Firefox aren't checking CA revocation lists
by is39 on Sunday April 13, 2014 @05:10PM
(#7583043)
I think this would be a good approach on many levels.
It appears there is already an (expired?) internet draft for this: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-pala-rea-ocsp-over-dn... http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-pala-rea-ocsp-over-dns-00
But i could not find any browser support or even plugins.
I guess all current development is behind DANE and/or multi-OCSP-stapling; second one has some chance of being deployed soon.
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=611836 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6961/
--igor