The defined behaviour would be to discard the packet. In a secure language, the buffer would have had a "length" property, and the code would have crashed when a read beyond the buffer's end was attempted. But in C, buffers are just pointers, so there is fundamentally nothing wrong with reading beyond the end of the buffer. So instead of a crash, we get silent memory exposure.
Isn't this basically the whole point of QuickCheck-like testing frameworks? They're basically a specification that is attempted to be falsified in some way by a fuzzer. I don't see why most C projects couldn't be doing this.
I think they don't do this because it's not a widely known testing method, and it's kind of tricky to implement these tests correctly.
But then again, with some dedication, quickcheck-like testing can do a huge amount of work. At work I've implemented these tests for the entire low-level IO framework for our servers and these few tests are a pure meat grinder. It triggered one severe bug that would have downed production in the middle of the night and then some more.
You could also look at this bug as an input sanitization failure. The author didn't consider what to do when the length field in the header is longer than what comes over the wire (even when writing the code in a secure language, this case should be handled somehow, maybe by logging or dropping the packet).