Its not always fraud, but some the of tactics get pretty scammy. One highlighted in Flash Boys is a classic bait-and-switch, perpetuated with perverse fee incentives of a "taker rebate" on BATS BYX. I said more here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7532902
"Scammy" might be a loaded word. In any case, I'd like to hear a sensible purpose to the inverted fee structure.
Takers who get paid at inverted venues understand and are compensated by rebate for the information they provide to the market. Their net price is less than what they would pay elsewhere and the cost of doing so is less access to liquidity (inverted venues typically show a lot less size) and potentially more information leakage (although, it is time dependent).
Bear in mind that if you look at the markets near transition, there is often times no posted orders on the weak side of the NBBO. Makers typically don't like to stand in front of the truck as its rolling towards them. The argument that inverted venues leak as buy side sweeps is fairly weak given this reality.
And if mom's broker doesn't understand that the taker rebate leaks more information than its worth, that's just tough on mom. Mom can't just get a better broker, she's locked into her IRA through the workplace. This is a zero-sum game with some people on the take while mom & pop get the shaft.
http://insider.thomsonreuters.com/link.html?cn=share&cid=122...
Traders who post orders have no negative obligations in the current market structure. In previous years market makers were given special privileges for negative obligations. The best known example were NYSE specialists. A specialist post at the NYSE was extremely lucrative. If you believe previous short-term intermediaries made no money you should consider that Goldman bought SLK, a large well known specialist, for 6 billion. They recently sold the unit off for 30 million. In 2014 HFT profits IN TOTAL are estimated to be between 1 and 1.5 billion (http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/rbc-capital-markets-...).
Market makers with negative objects and special privileges has lost out as a model to non-contracted market makers who post liquidity. The posted liquidity is very real and completely tradeable. RBC's Thor smart order router is proof of this as it achieves 100% fill rates (http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/rbc-capital-markets-...)
With respect to Mom & Pop, you should investigate what an internalizer is. Nearly 100% of all retail order flow is sold to a wholesaler. Wholesalers like Knight, UBS, etc trade with that flow and provide payment to the broker to do so. Mom & Pop who submit an order from Fidelity or Ameritrade get amazing execution. If you read about and follow the current debate, you'll find that no one is disputing this. What they are disputing is whether buy-side institutions (for example, Mutual Funds) acting indirectly on behalf of Mom & Pop are being disadvantaged. I argue that these institutions have a responsibility and the capability to select competent brokers to execute their large trades. They ARE professionals, after all. Lest you think ALL buy side firms dislike HFT I refer you to Vanguard's comment letter to the SEC, which you can find here: http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-122.pdf In it you'll find a firm with about 2.5 trillion under management disagreeing to a large extent that HFT is bad. Finally, with respect to retail brokerages, you can read Charles Schwab perplexing condemnation of HFT here: http://pressroom.aboutschwab.com/press-release/corporate-and... This is from a firm that sells nearly all of its order flow to UBS for internalization within its dark pool by HFT and other firms. Go figure.
I recommend educating yourself on this debate. It is highly nuanced and very complex. The US equities markets have many facets that go well beyond the displayed market and HFT. The vast majority of professionals in this business would agree on 90% of the desired regulatory change: faster SIP and allowing locked markets are two large ones. You'll also likely get a large consensus on eliminating all payment for order flow including rebates paid by lit venues as compensation for posting resting orders and absorbing adverse selection risk.
Take care.
Would you recommend this as advice to YC companies looking to secure VC?
Tactic seems ripe for abuse in M&A negotiations as well.
Would it be reasonable for a YC (or other investment) offer to be paired with "decide in an hour or we give it to someone else? Probably not. Would it be reasonable for that timeframe to be a week or two? Probably.
* Because the term sheet usually has conditions that the entrepreneur is obliged to honor.
* Because the term sheet is provided after the VC is given access to all the details of the entrepreneur's financials.
* Because the ruthless withdrawal of a term sheet puts the entrepreneur in a distress situation that harms their ability to obtain other term sheets.
There are other reasons, but the analogy is, to me, obviously inapplicable.
Not quite. Use your example of a large block trade.
* Because it is incredibly expensive: check
* Because the B/D agmt usually has conditions: check
* Because the execution is provided after all the details of the trade/'s financials: check
* Because the ruthless withdrawal of a term sheet could put the [trader's book] in a distress situation that harms their ability to obtain [another execution]: check.
Obtaining funding is incredibly hard. Each individual term sheet is also incredibly hard.
Shopping a block is hard. Posting a limit order is incredibly cheap, cheaper than it has ever been in human history. Failing to execute also doesn't make posting a next limit order more expensive.
Put your security research hat on for a moment. The "other side" of the trade wants to get the info subject to BD confidentiality (pt 2) and the exploit them (pt 3,4). When your BD does this it is expressly illegal. This has a name but mentioning it here would just confuse the issue. The question is this: what tools are available to this "other side" that would put the NPI in the hands of the "other side" but not divulge it more broadly? Would a bad-faith offer to do a ("sweet") biz deal be good enough bait to social engineer selective disclosure? Unless you can rule this out technologically, you have to rule it in for consideration.
It's best not to get sidetracked on whether the divulged info is legally NPI or PI (just yet) and look at it purely from a pragmatic perspective like a security credential. The BD either has it under control or not. And is it physically possible in terms of bits to have selective disclosure? And if it is does the pretext matter?
Make no mistake: the BD cannot hide if he abuses the information directly. He's like an authorized user. The issue is what level of authorization you give the counter-party and how to protect its abuse. The technical details and legality of pretexting security credentials is something I'm sure you could speak authoritatively to. I'm only using it as an example here for illustrative purposes.
"When executing trade orders on behalf of a customer, the institution is said to be acting as a broker"
This sidebar conv. seems to be degrading a bit.
General comment: I think you are over simplifying the P&L of a trader. The HFT stuff impacts hedging costs. And the ability to solicit grey/NPI. Note they are not urelated.
Also, if you just look at bid/ask and Volume...you never see the $$ value of this.
Las comment: the so called: "profit guarantees" just means perfectly hedged trades with no ∆ (net exposure). its not literal its a simplification yet directionally correct.
That is the point I raised here when you jumped in. Its a fair counter-point to say that adding strategic uncertainty is not blanket illegal. But as a general rule, we don't encourage bad faith actors.
Same is my view on posting comments to HN.
The reason I raised this point with the sub-thread op is as follows. Not goint to use my own words to provide some objectivity. This is from PG, so I hope you respect it at face value.
To founders, the behavior of investors is often opaque—partly because their motivations are obscure, but partly because they deliberately mislead you. And the misleading ways of investors combine horribly with the wishful thinking of inexperienced founders. At YC we're always warning founders about this danger, and investors are probably more circumspect with YC startups than with other companies they talk to, and even so we witness a constant series of explosions as these two volatile components combine.[1]
This is important insight. It mentions the risk of bad faith dealings specifically and at a general level of abstraction that is intuitive to grasp. Its good reading for its intended audience.
I'm going to re-word this to put this in a slightly different context (but one relevant to this thread). These are words I would not have a problem putting in front of a rookie trader on day 1 of the job:
To [a rookie], the behavior of [deal counter-parties] is often opaque—partly because their motivations are obscure, but partly because they deliberately mislead you. And the misleading ways of [counter-parties] combine horribly with the wishful thinking of inexperienced [rookies -- that are unprepared]. At [Co X] we're always warning [rookies] about this danger, and [counter-parties] are probably more circumspect with [our trades] than with other companies they talk to, and even so we witness a constant series of explosions as these two volatile components combine.
The motivations and ways trades can go wrong have similarities accross asset classes. Market practitioners can speak to this from experience. Over tha past 15 years or so, in particular more shops have become "stage agnostic" in PE and "asset class agnostic" in various other vehicles. The reason this is possible is because these abstractions have become better known.
* You've fled to abstraction rather than discussing the specific argument that you yourself brought up.
* You've appealed to a supposed authority (Paul Graham) who is simultaneously (a) not an authority of the ethics and assumptions of trading markets and (b) not actually making any statements about trading markets.
* You've begged the question, asserting that because ruthless withdrawal of a term sheet is unethical, therefore cancellation of a resting limit order must also be unethical.
That is not the same advice as condoning bad faith, manipulative behaviour. The advice is to act as if bad actors exist. The advice is <not> to act "as a bad actor".
When it comes to cancellations, it's way to facile to say something like 'cancelations are always possible, therefore all cancellations are always kosher'. Instead, markets are <always> structured along the lines of 'bad faith is always possible, therefore precautions are always taken'. Again, this parallels with network security so I'm sure I don't need to explain it from first principles.
If you want to argue "bad faith is always possible, but..." then that's fine. You need to explain why precautions should be discarded. The idea that we should look the other way to bad faith is not justifiable as a standalone idea. You would actually need to show that bad faith could do no harm because of XYZ technological protection.
If you want to make the argument that technology provides "perfect security", you are welcome to do this. But not only do you need to establish that, you also need to establish the social equivalent. That is, that all business contracts are "perfectly written" and all legal proceedings are "perfectly resolved", and that the costs of all this perfection are ~essentially zero.
That is the path of least resistance for your position.
see also:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7523186
esp sub thread
This isn't a subtle point; it's so obvious that it's hard to understand why it even needs saying.
[Again, this is just like a security analysis. You'd never accept #random_persons_problem thrown your way without context, would you?]
#1 In a simple world like open-outcry, exchange-exclusive markets (not dis-similar to the 1990's) even the most basic scenario is nothing HFT intermediation today. Not only instanaeous execution but live-presence real-time surveilance and extended serial-reciprocity, etc. These are non-reproducible safe-guards {all} in HFT sceanios of ineterst.
#2 "Cancellation of a resting limit order isn't "bad faith"" even this concept in plain english is wrong. I may act in bad faith deliberately. You can't rule that out. You can't make indference about my intentions. You can only hope that the consequences are not a problem. If the rules are perfectly written and enforced, &tc.
#3 The consequences of #2 depend upon the context of #1, but fleshed out in full detail. Its possible to design systems where the <consequences> of bad faith are greater and lesser problem/s. Totally fair point. And if you assume a perfect world, you asymptoically get to a place where "you don't need to worry about it". Alternatively, you can design a world that goes in the other directin.
#4 "Cancellation is one of the rules of the game." Rules everywhere are grey. And this is buy only a single one of many that interact together.
Read the second link in my earlier note. This is as much technical issue. Unless you are at that level, everything else is completely trivial.
Anyways, enjoy the rest of the book.
You're essentially litigating not just all of electronic trading, but, from what I can tell, much of trading, period.
We have a bunch of laws that establish the pretense that everybody in the market is equal. I suspect we should get rid of most of the laws and drop the pretense. Folks should participate with the understanding that there are unfairly advantaged operators at all levels. But until that happens it's hard to morally square aspects of HFT.
There is no mechanism on the lit markets for anyone to see an order BEFORE it interacts by either posting to the book or being crossed with another order and generating a trade. Anyone who says otherwise is unfortunately misinformed.
Can you think of one active in today's market?
Yes and no. To continue the analogy, if your counterparty checks his cards every few minutes, while you are sitting at the table and monitoring continuously, is that your fault that your decision making strategy has a much tighter feedback loop than his?
In a lot of ways, the HFT practitioners and the portfolio managers (or other active, but infrequent, trader) are playing complementary, but very different games. The portfolio manager wants to move large blocks of stock, and pays for liquidity. The market maker facilitates the motion of large blocks of stock, and charges a premium for assuming the risk of adverse, short-term market movements.
Exchanges offer price-time priority. A 'better' price (higher bid, lower offer) gives you priority over a 'worse' price. Given two orders at the same price, an earlier order gives you priority over a later order.
If you spend millions of dollars on computers, data feeds, and salaries to skilled personnel, to predict the motion of markets correctly and work within the system to make money, then you've earned that money fair and square. Companies that don't operate within the rules get shut down fast and hard by the SEC and/or FINRA. This is a highly regulated and policed industry.
HFT is hardly different from Warren Buffett identifying a company with a 10-100 year time horizon. Should we penalize Buffett because he's smarter and better at that game than everyone else in the world? Is he scamming the person from whom he bought shares in 1984?
As Knight Capital showed us two years ago, you can spend those millions, and still screw up and lose $10M per minute for the better part of an hour until your firm is bankrupt. No one is guaranteed to make money.
Posting an order and canceling it is fair game. When the order is in the market, it's a live intent to trade. When it's canceled, it's no longer a live intent to trade. Why is this "moral" when it's a person doing this on a time scale of seconds or minutes, but "fraud on the market" when it's a computer doing it on a time scale of micro or milliseconds? If someone hits that HFT computer's bid, there's an obligation to fill that order - nothing is different about such an order just because it's placed and canceled quickly. The only objection is fear of the unknown. And the only difference here is that it's being done based on an automated strategy, faster than people can react. Your broker has access to HFT tools. Your 401(k) manager has access to HFT tools. If you're a day trader, your order is probably being routed through HFT tools.