What about namecoin?
Sorry, haven't looked into namecoin. But I would presume that as long as you already know the domain name, no MitM can happen, and no explicit trust has to be placed onto anyone. This is true for, e.g., Tor hidden services, wherein if one knows the .onion name, they'll know if messages coming from that service are actually from that service, because they'll be signed by an ephemeral key that is itself signed by a key the fingerprint of which is the .onion name itself. (This is a gross oversimplification, and I could have made a mistake anyway..)
If a similar scheme is true for namecoin addresses, then the situation is better indeed.
fwiw, here's a rather relevant post: http://unhandledexpression.com/2014/04/07/revisiting-zookos-...
You have to start trusting someone in a web of trust (or in wherever.) Just because you can do smart end to end encrypted communication with all the relays / with everyone you want to, someone has to guarantee that you're not being MitM'd (during e.g. DH key exchange.) At least that's my understanding anyway.