EDIT: May I ask what can be gained from faulting SendGrid in this case?
Actions SendGrid could take:
* Make it impossible for their front-line support staff to change the email address on file. If you want that -- which should be extremely rare! -- you talk to a high-level manager who is competent at authenticating you.
* Send the email that says "hey, we're going to change your email address now" with a lead time to allow for the possibility that, even after your authentication, you've been conned.
* Make a phone call to the phone number on record, too.
You ask what's gained by faulting SendGrid, because you take it as a given that they will make these changes. But that's not how blame works. The blame serves a function of ensuring those changes by holding them accountable for their current problems.
Or perhaps they should allow customers to require that they contact a secondary authority to confirm the change should be made?
Sendgrid can also change their systems so that phone support personnel can NOT perform this change or perform this change with approval from a supervisor.
Sendgrid being in the business they are in should also know that they are susceptible to these types of attacks and what they can lead to (many, many systems which can have password requests sent to email addresses).