1) You decide how valuable the account is, the probability that you will lose access to the account, and the probability that the account will be attacked. 2) You selected the required number of recovery actions, from one recovery action to completely unrecoverable. Possible recovery actions include (copied from NFSN):
* You provide a scanned copy of a government-issued photo ID. * You provide a scanned copy of a statement showing both the most recent deposit and a name and address matching one of your accounts. * You complete SMS verification. (SMS must be previously configured.) * You complete 2-factor verification. (2-factor auth must be previously configured.) * You correctly answer your security question. (Security question and answer must be previously configured, below.) * You use an ssh key to create a file with a specific name on one of your sites hosted here. (Must be previously configured, won’t work if account is empty.) * We try and fail to contact you via your currently configured email address. (This one may take a long time.)
As far as I'm concerned, this is the way it should be done. The public details are on their blog: https://blog.nearlyfreespeech.net/2014/02/28/price-cuts-more...
Maybe they FedEx the password to your physical address on file. Maybe they contact all phone numbers and emails they have for you and say "someone has requested an emergency override, if you object call us back in the next 4 hours." Maybe they do a Skype session and compare your photo to the one they have on file.
All this costs money, of course. That's the price of doing business.
Do you tell the user on signup to print an in-case-of-emergency-break-glass password which is only ever to be used to get into a locked account and other special circumstances?
It may seem over the top but seeing as it's unique across service providers, I think it's a hell of a lot better than the overly abused "what is your mother's maiden name" type questions. I consider these questions to be in the same boat as sharing passwords between websites (since they are)!
(And if someone has managed to break into both your personal email account and your business's online-banking account, getting your web-host to recognize you will be the least of your problems.)
Consider a determined attacker. A posted signed letter has zero cost and is easily forged and a phone call is free via Skype. There's plenty of low-tech ways to circumvent security.
1) You sign up, enable two-factor auth, then lock yourself out (lost password and your second-factor). How do you prove to the service provider that you are you?
2) You sign up, enable two-factor auth, then Mallory claims that they locked themselves out. How does the service provider prove that Mallory is not you?