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[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_budget_of_the_United_...
Perhaps more critically, since the US grid seems to be operated by a number of competing companies, it may be less likely that the system itself will be made resilient, because there is limited cooperation.
If the people of the US decided to spend money on hardening power delivery, would the money come from tax dollars, or electricity bills?
Walls are not expensive. I don't think that anyone engaged in a systematic attack on the distribution network is going to be particularly deterred by the threat of prison, given the potential strategic payoff.
A large-scale blackout plus an attack on the only factory that makes those large transformers has the potential to cripple Us industrial capacity for weeks, if not months.
The article focuses on solutions involving physical security. Perhaps it would be more cost-effective to bolster deterrents? For example, life in prison for anyone convicted of sabotaging a major facility of any kind (in the Metcalf case, this could include both the shooting and the cutting of telecom fiber beforehand).
There also seems to be less focus on improving the resilience of the system as a whole--given that the threats are being modeled to determine minimum amounts of sabotage required, why not emphasize increasing that minimum, rather than reinforcing the few critical points of failure? Computing has moved in the direction of resilient systems made of less reliable components, and so could the grid.
As an aside, a blackout in summertime can be pretty interesting. The one in 2003 brought people together in new ways--I experienced a sense of community which was quite unusual, "old fashioned" you might say.