FWIW, it was proposed and supported by Abel Maldonado, who is a GOP politician, and it was opposed by the state Democratic party.
The notion being "this wasn't forced through by the majority party", and it might therefore be more "fair"?
I voted no on that one, for whatever it's worth.
Basically, most offices (but not Presidential elections) in California now have what is really the general election as the "primary", with a potential runoff as the "general election" if needed.
In anything actually contested, I wouldn't think it common. Feinstein had almost four times the votes of any challenger in the primary, and still did not have a majority.
I expect it would be more common for more local and/or more obscure offices, but I don't know at all just how common.
Its early enough that the political strategies and funding streams haven't really adapted to it yet, so I'd be cautious in generalizing either way from the experience so far with the new system.
That being said, AFAIK, there have been very few, if any, first round majorities so far in the offices that used to have party primaries.
An important point, to be sure.
Actually, its, at least superficially, the reverse -- California replaced traditional partisan primaries with non-partisan "open primaries". Under the old partisan primary system, the general election featured the winners of the partisan primaries plus qualified non-party candidates, under the new non-partisan primary system the "primary" is a poorly-named open general election run using majority/runoff, if no candidate wins a majority in the "primary", a so-called "general election" is held which is actually a runoff election between the top two vote winners from the "primary".
Now, if you said the general elections held in the spring (they aren't "primaries" in the usual sense and shouldn't be called that) should use ranked ballots voting and select the Condorcet winner with tie-breaker elections held in the fall, where necessary, as FPTP elections between the members of the Smith set of the spring elections, I'd agree that might be a worthwhile improvement.
I recognize that ranked methods have some substantial benefits over approval voting, but there are drawbacks. Considering just the theoretical benefits and drawbacks in this context, I would agree with a preference for ranked methods. However, when we consider the complexity (and resulting decrease in transparency) I've come to prefer approval. Even so, I wouldn't strongly object to a ranked method.
It is because "approval", unlike relative preference, doesn't have a consistent meaning across different ballots (which is why it isn't a poor choice in open-ballots where it has a defined meaning, like a commitment to opt-in to the result where otherwise there is an option to opt-out.)
> I particularly reject any implication (if present) that plurality should be preferred to it.
Plurality is also a bad choice for most political elections. Or, for that matter, most elections of any kind. But if you are changing from plurality, approval is about the worst change you could make other than ones that could only be deliberately malicious (e.g., modifying plurality to elect the candidate with the lowest number of first place preference votes.)
> Considering just the theoretical benefits and drawbacks in this context, I would agree with a preference for ranked methods. However, when we consider the complexity (and resulting decrease in transparency) I've come to prefer approval.
I personally have no problem with democracy requiring expecting citizens to deal with concepts more complex than approval voting, since, actually, most of the things they are voting on are things more complex than approval voting.
There is a technical sense in which that's correct, but you're reading more into it than is there. Both approval and ranked choice methods have consistent meaning across ballots when the meaning is taken to be the impact on the election. Neither method expresses how much one candidate is preferred to another.
"Plurality is also a bad choice for most political elections. Or, for that matter, most elections of any kind. But if you are changing from plurality, approval is about the worst change you could make[.]"
I'm not sure I strongly disagree with this, when considering only the act of voting and the theoretical results. I do see the gap between plurality and approval, here, as far larger than the gap between approval and ranked choice (plurality is both a scoring method and a ranked method and so has all the theoretical problems of both). And I do think that other practical concerns are tremendously significant and favor approval (as I mentioned in the previous comment and elaborate on below) over ranked methods.
"I personally have no problem with democracy requiring expecting citizens to deal with concepts more complex than approval voting, since, actually, most of the things they are voting on are things more complex than approval voting."
First and most trivially: otherwise accepting your argument here, your comparison shouldn't be to the complexity of approval voting, but to the complexity of the proposed alternative.
Second (most significantly), I don't mean, mostly, "O NOES VOTERS WILL GET CONFUSED". I mean that counting ranked choice ballots is tremendously ugly compared to counting approval ballots. You have 10 candidates? You're tallying instances of 3.6 million possible ballots! The number that will actually be represented will surely be a fraction of that, but even so this is going to involve more (and uglier) mistakes and more opportunities for fraud (and appearance of fraud) because the system is so much more complicated. Further, running statistical analysis of IRV elections is, in practice, significantly harder than doing the same of other methods (say my connections in opinion research) though this could arguably be a feature.
Third, just because we're hoping they're able to deal with more complex issues doesn't mean adding complexity is a good thing. Complexity typically stacks. If there is a maximum complexity people can deal with, adding more in one place is going to reduce the amount they deal effectively with elsewhere.
Obviously, if ballot access or funds are still apportioned based on general election results, that's inappropriate.
No, since there is a big difference between reducing a person enough in a general to lose versus keeping them from being one of the top two.
"Obviously, if ballot access or funds are still apportioned based on general election results, that's inappropriate."
Which they would be. Plus, party collusion that happens (see federal election commission) pretty much locks a third party out of the general.
In 2012, keeping Emken from being in the top two in the primary would have required removing 278,800 votes. Giving Emken the victory in the primary would have required removing 3,098,000 votes.
To the degree that this is typical, I would say that there is a big difference but it favors spoilers.
"Which they would be."
What do you mean "would be"? This isn't hypothetical - is that the case in CA or isn't it? If it is, then it's a strong objection. If it isn't then it's an objection to a system that doesn't exist.
"Plus, party collusion that happens (see federal election commission) pretty much locks a third party out of the general."
Agreed, I just don't think this is a strong example of that.
I believe the math favors the two parties on primaries because they can pay to mobilize.
I'm not a lawyer, but I do believe CA has election considerations (and laws) based on how folks do in the general.
It sounds very much like the Democrats feared a Nader and the Republicans feared a Perot or Tea Party challenger. It solidifies the people who own the machines.
1) how that 5% was wasted in the next general is not really much of a debate