The object of a revolution is not usually to overthrow a regime, rather, it's to give political autonomy to the group. That's why secessionist movements are far more successful negotiating truce and power-sharing than insisting on imposing themselves over the entire region.

The most important ingredient is the group self-identity; you can be unhappy with the State all you want, on your own, but you will have to convince your would be comrades that: 1) the regime is harmful. and 2) that they can govern themselves better.

Philosophy is needed in that it gives the group a political framework they can use to imagine their Utopia governed by. A unifying philosophy is very important; if most people in the group can't see the future political rule being better than the current one, then there would be no mass popular movement. The IRA said they want Ireland as "another democratic European country" and it worked. In Palestine, half the people imagine their Utopia to be another secular Arab state, a la Syria and Egypt, while the other half wants an Islamic Republic, a la Iran. That's why it's easiest to kill a revolution from the inside, by introducing uncertainty to their philosophical foundation and spreading suspicion about the leading committee.

The easiest revolution would be one forged under clear differences, say, based on race, language, or religion. Marxism was unique in that it was revolution based on class.

1980-89 is pretty weak on their reading list, which would provide some insight to your question of how to overthrow a police state without external forces. Reading Timothy Garton Ash's work on Poland (The Polish Revolution is a good starting point) gives a lot of perspective into how a conservative Catholic majority can be the impetus for revolutionary change, and with greater earnestness than the dissident intelligensia at many times.

For theory, Havel's work is a bit out there but definitely interesting. Try "Power of the Powerless" and "On Evasive Thinking" (it's in his Open Letters, I think); these are two of his best political theory essays. Havel's a bit of a contested figure, but I think it's fair to say that he roughly lives by the principles he expounded in his theoretical works, and that his emphasis on public dissent as a means of taking down authoritarian regimes heavily influenced other East Bloc dissidents.

Many Romanians consider their revolution only a partial success.

Many of the old party bosses made it into high spots in the government after the revolution, and continue in these positions to this date.

> I would actually be most interested in how to overthrow communist regimes.

It is actually very easy - just get yourself a place on the CIA payroll. This will take care of funding for propaganda, bribes, and parties for the right locals. It will also arrange a speedy getaway should your plan fail. Do your best to create and gather up "dissidents." Hype the bright capitalist future with stylish American pants for everyone which will surely come. Provoke demonstrations at every opportunity, inciting the local regime to violence; or, if the latter has become sclerotic and emasculated, you can stage an "orange" revolution using herds of bored college students. After you're done, invite your moneyed friends to buy up whatever is left of the country's industry and natural resources.

This recipe has an excellent track record in the former Soviet block.

It's more accurate to say that this had little to no track record in the former Soviet sphere. The US had essentially no involvement (often to the despair of Soviet bloc citizens) in any of the three major uprisings (1956, 1968 and 1980-89). In fact, in the last of these (the period of instability beginning with the Gdansk Shipyard occupation in Poland, kicking up in 1988 and continuing through the "Year of Revolutions"), US reaction was initially completely curtailed by the lack of a coherent Reagan policy on Russia/Poland. People were speaking freely, striking on a regular basis and eviscerating censorship, and the US couldn't decide whether providing increased economic assistance to Poland in exchange for continued toleration of the political situation might be a threat to detente/whether detente was really the best solution at all. It wasn't until later in Reagan's presidency that Gorbechev handed him an effective Russian policy.

Another thing that I think it's hard for the modern observer to acknowledge, given the benefit of hindsight, is the incredible ambivalence the Western left felt for some of these revolutionary movements. Many leftists of the 1968 generation wanted some form of socialism to work, and there was always a hope that an East Germany or Czechoslovakia could slowly reform into an authoritarian, yes, but competitive working-class social welfare state. The Polish uprising especially seemed to throw leftists off guard; here was a revolutionary movement dominated by conservative, Catholic traditionalists who wanted things to be _like they were before the war_. This wasn't in the discourse of the Democratic (by which I mean the party) mainstream, but it was a major element of leftist political thought of the time, and it's not hard to see how that could rub off on the measures and rhetoric American administrations were willing to take.

In short, the US was pretty much a nonentity when it came to "interference in the internal affairs" of Soviet puppet states. The "hardline" right was all talk and no action in deference to the longstanding policy of detente, and the moderate/radical left was too focused on criticizing American nuclear policy and too ambivalent about the broad-based dissident movements focused on individual liberties springing up in the Soviet bloc to push for intervention.

You have many good and interesting points, but

> The US had essentially no involvement (often to the despair of Soviet bloc citizens) in any of the three major uprisings

How do we know this? There is an ocean of still-classified documents from that period.

> the US was pretty much a nonentity when it came to "interference in the internal affairs" of Soviet puppet states.

In its official foreign policy, perhaps.

Talk to someone who reads the Russian-speaking blogosphere. This statement is heavily disputed there, for a wealth of excellent reasons (and not limited to the fact of just what kind of people benefited most from the overthrows.) The skeptics I'm talking about aren't on the level of the "9-11 truthers," either - the feeling that the US and its Western European lackeys deliberately undermined the USSR and its allies runs deep, and is not without foundation (see the Afghan War, for example. Or find someone who has heard Voice of America from the period. There is no shortage of evidence, if you care to look.)

Sorry, you are correct about US intervention in Afghanistan. I intended to limit the scope of my response to the Eastern bloc, not the entire Soviet sphere. Poor choice of words on my part.

The reason I can be pretty sure there wasn't much US involvement in Eastern bloc revolutionary movements is that these movements time and again followed one of two patterns: A. "Reformist" 1. Trusted, committed Party members have falling out with Party Secretary, who is heavy-handed/incompetent/annoying. 2. These Party members (usually Politburo) force out the Party Secretary and promise to get the worker's state back on track. 3. These new leaders (to the surprise of everyone) actually become popular by forcing out the hated leader and promising reform. 4. The non-elite classes (i.e. those not in the Party) get a little too excited in the midst of this public euphoria, and start calling for cheaper meat, less overbearing local Party hacks, freely-elected union representatives. 5. The Soviets march in.

B. "Dissident-led" 1. A small group of self-proclaimed dissidents publicly and repeatedly denounce the regime. 2. Because of this, they lose their (usually) intellectual, white-collar jobs, guarantee no secondary education for their children, endure frequent jail stints and get assigned back-breaking physical work. 3. Nevertheless, they refuse to back down, and instead continue their public activities. 4. The economy gets bad/a rally is organized for a slain WWII hero, and 10k-15k people strike/protest/rally in the streets of the capitol city. Anti-communist chants inevitably occur, and someone gets shot. 5. The shooting, and the Party's embarrassment about it, encourages more people to protest and gives them a reason to protest. Soon as much as 1/4 of the population is in the streets on any given day. 6. The Soviets march in/Gorbachev writes off the Eastern bloc.

Neither of these patterns is especially useful/conducive to US interests. The first severely damages right-wing interests; here is an example of the people of a Soviet puppet state showing trust and affection in their political leaders. If it had worked -- if Hungary or Czechslovakia had transformed into something closer to Sweden or even Yugoslavia -- the meme of socialism as perpetrator of evil would be tarnished. It's also difficult to generate political enthusiasm by more than a few hundred people. That just doesn't happen, no matter how much money/support you give.

The second pattern is even more difficult to produce. Anyone willing to be bought off is a rational actor, and in 1977 nobody believed the Soviet Union was going to disappear anytime soon. Why would you give up all earthly comforts for a future that would likely never come?