Mt. Gox Resigns Bitcoin Foundation Board Seat

Re:Mt. Gox Resigns Bitcoin Foundation Board Seat by VMG on Monday February 24, 2014 @03:15AM (#7289634)

To be clear here: when broadcasting your transaction to the network, somebody can reissue your transaction with a different ID, but they cannot change the inputs and outputs.

There are other ways to track transactions other than the txid, for example by tracking a unique output address. A normalized hash routine has been added recently: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/3656#issuecomment-35...

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Re:Mt. Gox Resigns Bitcoin Foundation Board Seat by ak39 on Monday February 24, 2014 @06:43AM (#7290255)

Thanks.

Just a naive suggestion (will this work?):

Why not introduce some sort of a 2-phase commit with the original transaction and the newly inserted one on the block-chain? So, before the block-chain transaction is committed, check the two transaction id hashes, if they are different for the request, fail the transaction.

Edit: Of course, the eavesdropper could just as well pass the expected hash back to the originator anyways. :-( Hmmm

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Re:Mt. Gox Resigns Bitcoin Foundation Board Seat by VMG on Monday February 24, 2014 @09:06AM (#7290762)

That's not necessary. A transaction with a modified id is not a problem unless you falsely rely on the id for payment verification instead of tracking the inputs and outputs by a custom hash.

The biggest flaw here is probably the name "transaction id", because it suggests that a transaction can only have one valid id. The normalized id fixes this issue for most transaction types.

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