News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Apple's SSL/TLS bug by hueving on Saturday February 22, 2014 @02:01PM (#7283114)
At least that was public and fixed. I think the point is that keys could be completely deterministic on closed source systems and there is no way to know. It's very easy to have deterministic "random" sources that pass statistical tests for randomness.
Re:Apple's SSL/TLS bug by jey on Saturday February 22, 2014 @02:32PM (#7283240)
Not true. IIRC, the way the Debian bug was found was by some parties noticing a bunch of collisions of SSH public keys.

(For example, Github lets you push/pull via SSH as [email protected], and they determine your identity by the SSH key used.)

Re:Apple's SSL/TLS bug by hueving on Saturday February 22, 2014 @02:50PM (#7283312)
How is what I said not true? If the same thing as the Deb prng bug happened in a closed source system, it could sit for a couple of years exposing thousands/millions of systems and then be patched quietly to avoid embarrassment, leaving everyone vulnerable.
Re:Apple's SSL/TLS bug by lstamour on Saturday February 22, 2014 @05:41PM (#7283955)
FYI -- the source code here is public. Didn't help :D
Re:Apple's SSL/TLS bug by sneak on Saturday February 22, 2014 @07:05PM (#7284260)
It helped us realize how easy it would be to test for this, and that Apple isn't.
Re:Apple's SSL/TLS bug by lawnchair_larry on Saturday February 22, 2014 @08:09PM (#7284494)
I question your code comprehension. This is not easy to test for at all, and Chrome doesn't do it either. Do you understand how to exploit this issue?
Re:Apple's SSL/TLS bug by hueving on Saturday March 01, 2014 @03:44PM (#7326014)
Static analysis would have caught this immediately. It caused unreachable code that the compiler even recognized and optimized away.

You're saying Google Chrome doesn't test that an ephemeral key is actually signed by the cert's private key? If that's the case, that's completely unacceptable because it's the whole point of the protocol.