Re:When Debtors Decide to Default
by sokoloff on Monday July 27, 2009 @07:34PM
(#727023)
> If a particular person is deemed too much of a risk to lend to then they should not be lent money. How is it a better idea to lend them money at a higher interest rate?
That's the point of altering the interest rate: in many cases, it alters the outcome from "too risky [to be profitable]" to "profitable [based on modelling/predicted likelihood of payback]"
Imagine that a debtor borrowing $100 has a probability of paying back that $100 of p. If p is exactly 1 (for practical purposes), then the lender only needs to ask for nominal interest over whatever would be equivalent the "risk-free" T-bill rate.
If p is exactly 0.99, then they need to ask for some greater amount, perhaps roughly an additional 1% margin (somewhat higher in practice to offset the administrative work). Surely you would agree that banks should be allowed to extend people credit cards at a 5% interest rate, right?
Now make p = 0.95. Now a bank needs to ask at least 6% over the T-bill rate, but you're very likely still OK with them requiring 10% interest on credit cards.
Now make p = 0.90. Now a bank needs to ask at least 11% over the T-bill rate, but you're probably still OK with them requiring 16% interest on credit cards.
If you're on board so far, by this point (in fact, in the step from 1.00 to 0.99 does the same thing, but it's just much more obvious now), you've agreed that different people can be charged different amounts, and if someone is deemed "too much of a risk to lend to at 5%", it logically follows that it is not the only solution to not lend, but rather for some borrowers to increase the interest rate until it is again profitable. (It's only as p approaches 0 that debtors become unprofitable at any rate.)
That's the point of altering the interest rate: in many cases, it alters the outcome from "too risky [to be profitable]" to "profitable [based on modelling/predicted likelihood of payback]"
Imagine that a debtor borrowing $100 has a probability of paying back that $100 of p. If p is exactly 1 (for practical purposes), then the lender only needs to ask for nominal interest over whatever would be equivalent the "risk-free" T-bill rate.
If p is exactly 0.99, then they need to ask for some greater amount, perhaps roughly an additional 1% margin (somewhat higher in practice to offset the administrative work). Surely you would agree that banks should be allowed to extend people credit cards at a 5% interest rate, right?
Now make p = 0.95. Now a bank needs to ask at least 6% over the T-bill rate, but you're very likely still OK with them requiring 10% interest on credit cards.
Now make p = 0.90. Now a bank needs to ask at least 11% over the T-bill rate, but you're probably still OK with them requiring 16% interest on credit cards.
If you're on board so far, by this point (in fact, in the step from 1.00 to 0.99 does the same thing, but it's just much more obvious now), you've agreed that different people can be charged different amounts, and if someone is deemed "too much of a risk to lend to at 5%", it logically follows that it is not the only solution to not lend, but rather for some borrowers to increase the interest rate until it is again profitable. (It's only as p approaches 0 that debtors become unprofitable at any rate.)