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Re:Keybase.io by tptacek on Thursday February 13, 2014 @11:13PM (#7236868)
Then the only difference between hushmail and your model is exactly what the FBI will get a subpoena to have you type into your server to subvert your users. The models are equivalently insecure.

Incidentally, you can't simply audit the "front-end Javascript"; you have to evaluate everything that influences the Javascript runtime (the DOM, stylesheets, cached resources, &c) every time the page loads. Browsers aren't designed to make content-controlled code "auditable"; it simply isn't a capability of the environment.

Re:Keybase.io by chaitanya on Friday February 14, 2014 @01:11AM (#7237211)
FWIW, I found your post "Javascript Cryptography Considered Harmful" very helpful in understanding problems with client side crypto in the browser. I will recommend it to anyone who thinks it is safe: http://www.matasano.com/articles/javascript-cryptography/
Re:Keybase.io by e_proxus on Friday February 14, 2014 @04:47AM (#7237707)
And don't forget all extensions which can "Access all your data on all webpages, Access all your tabs and browsing activity".
Re:Keybase.io by jessaustin on Saturday February 15, 2014 @01:39AM (#7242947)
If this functionality were provided by e.g. a signed extension (so the code can't be changed without the user being told: I think browsers can do this?), then you would worry mostly about how well that extension was sandboxed away from other extensions and various websites, right?