Re:Bitcoin transaction malleability: looking at the bytes
by nullc on Thursday February 13, 2014 @02:34PM
(#7233680)
All of the transaction except the "signature"s is signed. The modifications come from modifying the signatures and/or their encoding.
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Re:Bitcoin transaction malleability: looking at the bytes
by codeflo on Thursday February 13, 2014 @02:43PM
(#7233742)
Well, the signature itself can't be signed (obviously). But that's not a problem for many other uses of cryptographic signatures, there's something about the Bitcoin protocol that makes this an issue, and I'm trying to understand what that is.
Why is there any choice in how the signature is encoded? Why is there some sort of "script" (I'm not sure I understand this part) that's important enough to be hashed, but not important enough to be signed? This looks like a very deliberate design decision.
Re:Bitcoin transaction malleability: looking at the bytes
by oillio on Thursday February 13, 2014 @07:59PM
(#7236035)
Due to the intricacies of ECC (the cryptography used in signing transactions) the signature can always be mutated to produce a different, but equally valid signature.
If the developers want to avoid transaction malleability, they will not be able to include the signature in the hash.
Re:Bitcoin transaction malleability: looking at the bytes
by Anderkent on Friday February 14, 2014 @10:04AM
(#7238853)
> If the developers want to avoid transaction malleability, they will not be able to include the signature in the hash.
Would that be a problem? Since a transaction is already uniquely identified by the inputs, why not hash everything that's signed and use that as the identifier in (tx, index) pair?
Re:Bitcoin transaction malleability: looking at the bytes
by gus_massa on Thursday February 13, 2014 @03:05PM
(#7233898)
I can’t find the exact quote or reference now, but IIRC it was possible to sign a .Net assembly or script, and the signature was in a special block that said “Please ignore this block to calculate the signature”. So you can create the whole thing, calculate the signature and put it in the correct slot without changing the signature.
Re:Bitcoin transaction malleability: looking at the bytes
by oillio on Thursday February 13, 2014 @08:03PM
(#7236065)
This is effectively how bitcoin transactions work now. It gets considerably more complicated when you include multi-party signatures. In this case, transactions are signed by multiple private keys, but none of the parties will know the other signatures before they sign the transaction themselves.
Re:Bitcoin transaction malleability: looking at the bytes
by joeyh on Thursday February 13, 2014 @05:02PM
(#7234756)
Why is the signature fed through a bitcoin script? Not using a (non-turing-complete-but-still) programming language to encode a signature seems like a good first step to avoiding malleability.
Bitcoin has good/interesting reasons for using scripts inside transactions, but AIUI these are separate from the signature script.