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Re:Broken by design: systemd by andor on Monday February 10, 2014 @11:02AM (#7211730)
The journal sealing provides forward security. The sealing keys are exchanged regularly, and the old keys are deleted safely. A verification key, which is stored on another device or offline, can be used to calculate the sealing key for any given moment. While an attacker can change the logs, this will always be visible in an audit.

http://lwn.net/Articles/512895/

https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/397.pdf

Re:Broken by design: systemd by d0 on Monday February 10, 2014 @11:08AM (#7211762)
the old keys are deleted safely

Assuming nothing has managed to redirect those unlinks for example...

Re:Broken by design: systemd by andor on Monday February 10, 2014 @03:25PM (#7213543)
I guess you're right. The mechanism is forward-secure, which means for an attacker that tampering the logs is the first thing to do, not the last ;-)

As soon as the attacker manages to extract the state of the key generator from memory at one point of time, the log entries from that and the following sealing periods can be modified and cleanly sealed.