On the other hand, I tend to believe that crime victimizes far more people than law enforcement does, and that not only is it not a bad idea to make LEOs more efficient using technology and better intelligence (though not foreign surveillance intelligence!), but that it is a moral imperative for society to do so.
Where we can probably join up again in principle is that our specific criminal enforcement priorities make this whole thing way more fraught than it should be. I agree that criminal charges are an instrument of institutional racism, and I agree that drug prohibition is harming society far more than drugs themselves do.
I don't buy the "we're all criminals" line at all. And yeah, I read Silverglate's book.
It's either true or it isn't. It's arguably worse that nobody even quite knows whether we're all committing felonies than knowing the answer for sure. We shouldn't even be having a "debate", it should be readily obvious.
This shit happens: http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2012/September/Orchid-Kingpin-... Yes, it's one anecdote, but it happens.
It's not just that I think "eavesdropping should be done by domestic agencies", but also that I think eavesdropping should be done under the aegis it has always supposedly been done under, one that acknowledges that eavesdropping is the most intrusive investigatory act the government can engage in, that monitors the private thoughts of individuals and in many cases causes defendants to effectively testify against themselves.
It would be difficult for a domestic law enforcement agency to build anything resembling the infrastructure NSA has built, for exactly that reason: the cost/benefit ratio just couldn't ever work out. That's why NSA/FBI "fusion" is so scary to me; it repurposes an infrastructure that has a workable cost/benefit because it's budgeted for in a military context. That's what I mean by incentive problems.
But once again: "parallel construction" isn't new. It's also what happens when highly-placed criminal informants help make cases against organized criminals; to use the CI themselves as part of the chain of evidence would be to risk losing that CI. I'm not sure how much the practice bothers me in this context. And, like I said: other parts of the "parallel construction" story bother me a lot more than the NSA evidence; for instance, our new unelected canine prosecutors.
The difference is that the use of informants to generate investigatory leads is constitutionally unproblematic. There is no constitutional right to not be ratted out by an associate.
On the other hand, there is a constitutional right to the privacy of ones telecommunications. Therefore, using investigatory leads that are the product of illegal surveillance is constitutionally problematic, because of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
A failure to inform the defendant of how the investigation began deprives him of his ability to argue that the evidence against should be suppressed because it was obtained directly or indirectly as the fruit of an illegal search (wiretap).
Here's a thought experiment: What if law enforcement was perfect? That is, every time someone broke a law, the state knew and could arrest them. Let's also assume this technology somehow disallowed even the slightest peek into an individual's legal private life. After a week under such a system, we'd all likely be jailed.
There are so many laws; so many unjust laws, that we're all criminals. Giving law enforcement more tools just puts the DA in a position of greater power.