One can use any cryptographically secure (output indistinguishable from random, infeasible to predict input given output, et c) hash as a KDF but the faster it is to run, the more per second an attacker can try when attempting to bruteforce your password/phrase after stealing your private key in its encrypted, on-disk format.
bcrypt is a function that is specifically designed to be somewhat time consuming to calculate (with a variable difficulty argument to the function itself), to reduce the bruteforce rate (in normal use, it's only run once or twice, once for each password input). Its cousin scrypt was specifically designed to also require a fair bit of memory to calculate, as well, reducing effective parallelism in fpga/asic implementations as the memory circuits must be included as well.
The difference between one <1ms hash and 100ms hash doesn't much matter to a user, but is the difference between a 10-char password being feasibly bruteforceable or not on dedicated hardware where you have to run 256^10 iterations. It adds up fast.
My ssh private key password is 8 chars that match [a-z0-9]. This matters a lot.
The NIST competition process of favoring performant algorithms is not always in the interests of users because it means it's cheaper to bruteforce/crack.