Re:The Anatomy Of The Twitter Attack
by jorgeortiz85 on Sunday July 19, 2009 @02:09PM
(#713190)
Oh, that's real smart. So when you assign "Oc3j$ool>93*dl" as some user's password, they're just going jot it down on PostIt notes all over their desk, leave little .txt files on their desktop with it, add it to their cellphone as the "Password" contact, and stash it for "safekeeping" in all their email accounts. Great security you've got there.
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Or they could, y'know, put it in their wallet. Like their SSN and their credit card number.
Password complexity requirements don't really help. Most people just wind up picking password001 or password #001. In fact, we almost ensure that people will write passwords down when we make them remember weird, long strings and make them change it every few months as part of an arbitrary password change policy. I remember reading a paper (can't find the reference now) on how password change policies originated in the 60s and there's no data to support that they actually help with security.
Re:The Anatomy Of The Twitter Attack
by jorgeortiz85 on Monday July 20, 2009 @01:34AM
(#714007)
It boggles the mind that SSNs and CC#s are supposed to be secret. You, literally, give them out to anyone who asks.
Most people give out their passwords to anyone who asks as well (e.g. the "password for a chocolate bar" test.) People just aren't in the habit of asking for that.
They do all of those things already, or hadn't you noticed?
What's more likely? A cracker breaking into the office and copying down their password? Or an electronic attack against their lame passwords? Electronic attacks are far more likely than a physical attack.