1. make key compromise harder, for instance require that an attacker compromise both your hardware and software to get your key,
2. limit the damage a key compromise can cause, for instance expire keys more often, randomly reissue keys,
3. and increase the speed with which you can recover from a key compromise. For example, the web PKI is completely compromised if a single CA key is compromised, but chrome can detect valid but forged google certs using key pinning and thereby alert the world. You can only use the stolen CA key to attack Google users once.
The security community is advancing on all three fronts.
Horrible example. Crypto, like every other secret keeping method comes down to trust. Who, and what do you trust to keep your secret.
So, one must assume that given enough interest, the governments will be able to compromise any system, and any data on these systems.
What if both him and his recipient do the same? Then you need physical access (and unnoticed physical access I'd add) to the offline computer to be able to decrypt right?
And physical access doesn't scale.
What if they swap Scheier's USB key (or drive) with one that will exploit the USB stack on his offline computer (disabling 'auto-mount' won't help you here)?
Yes, it's a physical access attack, but physical access to his person might be easier to achieve (while remaining unnoticed) than access to the offline computer.
If that's too cumbersome, one could always implement a simple teletype-like system with a low bitrate. Like an automatic machine that can physically press keys on a keyboard. Then remove every key except letters, numbers, shift and tab.
You could use a similar system or OCR to get data off the gapped machine.
Also, the offline computer can be physically compromised.
It won't have much processing power, but it will still be sufficiently fast to handle strong crypto on text messages.
Or, if they're really really paranoid, there is always an option to use old trusty TTL components.
Or do I have to build my own chips? And hopefully I didn't make an implementation mistake.
I don't think I would entrust my private keys to this outfit, sorry.
And then there's what happened to Target. Someone got to their machines, not physically, but with a trusted download. That paranoia now has to be carefully thought through by everyone who cares about their security...
And by "Computers can be compromised", this means computers also cannot be trusted to hold any sensitive data.