The descriptor "quantum" to describe a computer is also actually kind of nonsense, because fundamentally a transistor works because of "quantum effects".
However: While I disagree that penrose's overarching idea that "brains are magic" is nonsense, his specific mechanism invoking microtubules may be correct (and I personally lean towards that mechanism and have for a while)... But I also don't think that has any bearing on "the computability of strong AI". It does however, have a bearing on "trying to develop strong AI by biomimicry", e.g. neural nets, deep learning nets, etc.
[1] http://research.microsoft.com/apps/video/default.aspx?id=177... [2] http://research.microsoft.com/apps/video/default.aspx?id=177...
I'm not arguing computational efficiency, here. Just "possibility". For the most part, say, a chemist like me (if I even resorted to a computational package) would do one or a handful of rounds, take a look, and say, 'that's good enough for me'. In the end, on the scale of things like microtubules, a first order approximation of whatever 'quantum effect' needs to be accounted for will probably suffice because randomness from just about everything else (e.g. brownian motion) will drown things in the noise.
But you wander off that point and return to the 'wet-and-noisy' argument he addresses explicitly in the abstract. Let's call it the Argument from Noise, or AfM.
Again, if you read the abstract, you'll see K explains how this new discovery makes moot the AfM (but not rebut it, as a rebuttal or refutation requires an argument; making moot merely requires a contradicting observation. E.g. if the cops have a watertight argument for how, why when and where X murdered Y, it's moot if 100 reliable witnesses report X was playing acoustic folk-rock at a nearby cafe at the time.)
Quantum origin of conscience might actually make teleporting not a horrible deal. Perhaps if you make a perfect duplicate of someone consciousness it gets entangled (or other technobable) and causes the person to briefly enter a coma like state until one of the duplicates is destroyed. In that case teleporting a la Star Trek wouldn't be as horrible as it is depicted - i.e. clone someone and then kill one original.
Note that it is still possible to describe consciousness as a computer -- it just has to be a quantum one. I find a lot of us techies relax around strong materialist positions (Penrose, Churchland, Searle) once you have coerced your interlocutor into admitting that there is no way of proving that there isn't an abstract(able) substrate. We can probably all agree that my Core i7 is not a mind. The disagreement amounts to whether or not a computing substrate of which all the relevant components have tidy classical explanations can be a mind, and after reading this, my fence-sitting on that issue is done. Without a single example of a functioning classical-mechanical mind, and strong evidence that quantum effects are nurtured within the brain, it would appear the magical-thinking quantum-worshipping nonsense-spouting materialist weirdos have it this time. Dammit.