I'm happy to be challenged on my philosophical disposition though, because I'm aware that there are whole schools of thought that seem like vague informal nonsense to me, and I'm not so arrogant as to assume I'm simply smarter than them.
[1] I don't understand relativity well enough to adapt my argument to it, so I'm happy to accept a counterargument there.
Note that from the outside, free-will is by definition apparently "random". It is a black box not determined by any variables in the greater world. What matters is that the free-will is mine or yours-- that the entity known as to me as myself or to you as yourself should also possess this power of determination which to the outside world appears random.
To witness to the lack of a logical incompatibility with determinism, you can posit a model wherein the will does something like project itself in both time directions in such a way as to keep up the "illusion of determinism". Not that I think such a mechanism is actually in place; this model is just to show there is no logical contradiction, and there could be other models that do the same.
I am entirely happy to accept that free will is compatible with determinism, and it sounds like we have similar views on this issue. Personally I consider ownership of "will" to be a far more important notion than that of some abstract metaphysical "freedom".
Free-will is a third possibility opposed to determinism of choice and pure randomness of choice.
But it is compatible with a either a deterministic or a probabilistic universe.
My choice of the feminine above was a choice, but not one everyone would make. So how could it be anything but determined by who I am?
The other major interpretation would be that out of the possible futures one is randomly selected based on its probability. Determinism without branching doesn't seem like an option given the laws of physics, correct me if I'm wrong anyone?
This comment goes into more detail about what we do know: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7069261
Also, if we were being obtuse, we can describe any (finite) probabilistic universe as a deterministic one with enough rules.
We're pretty close actually. Look up Bell's Theorem (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell's_theorem). It has been experimentally verified countless times and necessitates that "one is forced to reject locality, realism, or freedom". "Freedom" meaning something specific in a scientific sense. Rejecting the last one implies something called superdeterminism, which is basically just determinism (the "super" implies that everything that exists is deterministic; there are no random components). Gerard t'Hooft is one of the only legit physicists left who supports a superdeterministic theory. Almost all other physicists believe that a measurement of a quantum state collapses it into a random eigenstate.
For me personally, were superdeterminism found to be true (although it's looking more likely that's not going to be the case) it wouldn't bother me in the slightest, and I don't see a conflict between determinism and free will. Imagine someone creates a movie. They decide the plot -- what happens and when. They decide the setting, the number of characters, and everything else about the movie. Then when you play the movie, everything that occurs is predetermined -- deterministic in a sense -- yet it was freely chosen outside the realm of the movie. I kind of view reality that way.
But this is not what is classically understood by free-will, and I suggest that it is your dilemma which is false. Quoting Aquinas, "Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act."
I anticipate that free-will thus understood is likely ruled out a priori by your philosophical disposition. Nonetheless, I think you can perhaps come around to see that is logically opposed neither to determinism nor randomness in the human brain as observed from an objective standpoint.