Starting around 1997, he co-invented the Rubberhose deniable encryption
system, a cryptographic concept made into a software package for the Linux
operating system designed to provide plausible deniability against
rubber-hose cryptanalysis;[68] he originally intended the system to be used
"as a tool for human rights workers who needed to protect sensitive data in
the field."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julian_Assange#Computer_program...To start simply, it's certainly possible to prove that a disk installed with a base install of an OS (and then never touched) contains no encrypted volumes if all of the remaining blocks are empty. Every file can be compared to a known good copy and if there's no other data anywhere on the disk then there can't be anything hidden on it.
From there it's a case of proving that each bit of extra data on this disk relates to a file available under the OS or a fragment of such a file (now deleted). This gets progressively harder the more the disk has been used.
It impossible to deny this when you have a GB+ sized area of unpartitioned data (or unmounted partition) containing seemingly random noise. Or a similar GB+ sized file that you cannot demonstrate to be something benign by unpacking/decrypting/etc. "It's a file of random noise I generated" is going to set off the alarm bells.
Am I wrong or outdated on this?
So in that framework "stored somewhere" is a long ways from "You can characterize the contents of a known drive".
You'd need to basically never transmit the data, transmission automatically implies there is something there. If you didn't transmit, just used the data locally... And it appeared random, you'd have a pretty solid case for "they can't know". But if you slip up just once it's all over. They know.
If you mean concealing as in hidden partitions, data streams, or digital Stenography - these are all easily detectable upon close inspection. If there is extra bits where none are expected, this becomes a giveaway. Perhaps enough misdirection and a custom strategy of hiding could further obfuscate the location and content of the data, but as for hiding it's existence - this is not easily accomplished (if even possible).
If we believe that torture would cause me to disclose the password of a file without a hidden volume, wouldn't it be just as effective at getting me to give the password to my hidden volume?
https://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/FrequentlyAskedQue...
tl;dr: even if your adversary can't "prove" you have another encrypted volume, when they can see all the random data on your disk or inside the "outer" volume, you can't prove you don't have an "inner" one. In a situation shitty enough that you're compelled to divulge incriminating secrets, you're boned whether you have another secret volume or not. Elsewhere in the FAQ they propose zeroing out unused space on your disk whenever travelling to totalitarian states that could demand decryption keys.
Like the UK: http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2007/10/uk-can-now-demand...
If I zero out drive using traditional method - data is still recoverable.
If I zero out drive using random data - I can be suspect and/or get free rubber hose for life, trying to extract keys for something that doesn't even exist?
The authoritarians' apologists will probably note that to address your concerns, you should use random data first, to whatever extent you think will thwart recovery efforts, and then zero out your empty space.
Presumably that's not the case with TrueCrypt volume-within-a--volumes, but if you're using TrueCrypt there's already reason to suspect you might have hidden volumes.
It's impossible to prove the existence or nonexistence of hidden volumes, but that could be a good or bad thing depending on your adversary's willingness to jail/torture/kill you on suspicion alone.
I'm not aware of hidden volume software that integrates with "unsuspicious" file systems. Does something like that exist?
"Here's my data but you cannot read it" - does not runs so well with courts, high stakes competitors and deep pocketed enemies.
Once it is known "what to crack" the "how to" solution will be found. "Rubber hose cryptography" is one of these :)
If you're not possessing anything to crack (or so "they" think), you're safe :)