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Re:TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification by gesman on Wednesday January 15, 2014 @12:08PM (#7064480)
The new era of encryption will be marked not by making existing encryption solutions more secure, but by concealing the very act of existence of encrypted data.

"Here's my data but you cannot read it" - does not runs so well with courts, high stakes competitors and deep pocketed enemies.

Once it is known "what to crack" the "how to" solution will be found. "Rubber hose cryptography" is one of these :)

If you're not possessing anything to crack (or so "they" think), you're safe :)

Re:TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification by ot on Wednesday January 15, 2014 @12:22PM (#7064579)
Interestingly, this is something Julian Assange worked on several year before starting Wikileaks:

    Starting around 1997, he co-invented the Rubberhose deniable encryption
    system, a cryptographic concept made into a software package for the Linux
    operating system designed to provide plausible deniability against
    rubber-hose cryptanalysis;[68] he originally intended the system to be used
    "as a tool for human rights workers who needed to protect sensitive data in
    the field."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julian_Assange#Computer_program...
Re:TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification by pessimizer on Wednesday January 15, 2014 @01:20PM (#7065013)
Re:TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification by deeringc on Wednesday January 15, 2014 @12:17PM (#7064544)
The flip side of this is that it becomes impossible for someone to prove that they haven't got an encrypted volume stored somewhere. It will be interesting to see in which way the courts go with this.
Re:TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification by maxerickson on Wednesday January 15, 2014 @12:23PM (#7064582)
That's always been impossible.
Re:TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification by alexkus on Thursday January 16, 2014 @07:40AM (#7069019)
Not always (as long as you're talking about something they are in possession of, you're right if you mean you can't prove that you don't have some flash drive hidden somewhere but, then again, it need not be encrypted if they don't have access to it).

To start simply, it's certainly possible to prove that a disk installed with a base install of an OS (and then never touched) contains no encrypted volumes if all of the remaining blocks are empty. Every file can be compared to a known good copy and if there's no other data anywhere on the disk then there can't be anything hidden on it.

From there it's a case of proving that each bit of extra data on this disk relates to a file available under the OS or a fragment of such a file (now deleted). This gets progressively harder the more the disk has been used.

It impossible to deny this when you have a GB+ sized area of unpartitioned data (or unmounted partition) containing seemingly random noise. Or a similar GB+ sized file that you cannot demonstrate to be something benign by unpacking/decrypting/etc. "It's a file of random noise I generated" is going to set off the alarm bells.

Re:TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification by boobsbr on Thursday January 16, 2014 @10:08AM (#7069721)
If I remember correctly, when you buy a blank hard drive, and then format it, the formatting tool does not zero out the entire partition. The empty space left after a base install of an OS is note literally all zeroes or ones, it's random noise.

Am I wrong or outdated on this?

Re:TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification by maxerickson on Thursday January 16, 2014 @12:42PM (#7070984)
I think that knowability is one place where it pays to be careful and pedantic.

So in that framework "stored somewhere" is a long ways from "You can characterize the contents of a known drive".

Re:TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification by randywaterhouse on Wednesday January 15, 2014 @12:18PM (#7064551)
Implementations of crypto, such as Truecrypt, rely on algorithms/ciphers such as AES which (in some modes) basically appears random... But the appearance of randomness is not enough if someone is convinced there is meaningful data there. Of course, a break such as "we can tell if there's a hidden truecrypt volume" is bad, and if I recall correctly there are ways of doing this now.

You'd need to basically never transmit the data, transmission automatically implies there is something there. If you didn't transmit, just used the data locally... And it appeared random, you'd have a pretty solid case for "they can't know". But if you slip up just once it's all over. They know.

Re:TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification by 6d0debc071 on Wednesday January 15, 2014 @01:46PM (#7065235)
Or, transmit random data on a schedule indistinguishable from the actual data, I suppose.
Re:TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification by jballanc on Wednesday January 15, 2014 @02:39PM (#7065609)
Re:TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification by kaoD on Thursday January 16, 2014 @05:16AM (#7068777)
Number stations are always so creepy. Now I'm scared to get out of my room.
Re:TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification by scrrr on Wednesday January 15, 2014 @12:48PM (#7064761)
By the way, this is exactly why the NSA will not catch many terrorists. You can always hide data and you can always hide communication (which is just data written and read by two different endpoints).
Re:TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification by takeda on Wednesday January 15, 2014 @03:16PM (#7065850)
Spying on terrorists is just a red herring to keep public calm about it. I don't think NSA really cares about it, there are far more valuable benefits of spying.
Re:TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification by vezzy-fnord on Wednesday January 15, 2014 @12:16PM (#7064541)
That would be steganography then, which is distinct.
Re:TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification by goggles99 on Wednesday January 15, 2014 @12:21PM (#7064569)
I am not following you. Concealing? do you mean physically hiding the media on which it is stored? Like a flash chip in a tie clasp?

If you mean concealing as in hidden partitions, data streams, or digital Stenography - these are all easily detectable upon close inspection. If there is extra bits where none are expected, this becomes a giveaway. Perhaps enough misdirection and a custom strategy of hiding could further obfuscate the location and content of the data, but as for hiding it's existence - this is not easily accomplished (if even possible).

Re:TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification by kenj0418 on Wednesday January 15, 2014 @12:45PM (#7064737)
TrueCrypt offers a volume-within-a-volume option. The free space of a volume normally contains random data, and the hidden volume is presumably headerless. The idea is then to put something that you might want to hide in the outer volume (freaky porn, for example), then put your actual secrets (evidence of your criminal enterprise, for example) in the hidden volume. If forced to disclose the password, then only the outer volume is apparent and you can disclose that under duress.
Re:TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification by rprospero on Wednesday January 15, 2014 @03:20PM (#7065867)
The bit that's never made sense to me about that is that the attacker is equally aware of this feature of TrueCrypt. Once you've given the password for the outer volume, wouldn't the attacker just keep on with the rubber hose until you've also given the password for the inner volume? Obviously, she can't prove that there is an inner volume and she might just be wasting her time. On the other hand, you can't prove that there is NOT an inner volume, so it's in the attacker's best interest to just keep up the torture until either the attacker has enough keys that the encrypted data size equals that of the entire TrueCrypt volume or you've been killed by the rubber hose.

If we believe that torture would cause me to disclose the password of a file without a hidden volume, wouldn't it be just as effective at getting me to give the password to my hidden volume?

Re:TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification by jessaustin on Wednesday January 15, 2014 @01:08PM (#7064923)
This isn't a panacea. Check out what the dm-crypt folks have to say about it (question 5.2):

https://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/FrequentlyAskedQue...

tl;dr: even if your adversary can't "prove" you have another encrypted volume, when they can see all the random data on your disk or inside the "outer" volume, you can't prove you don't have an "inner" one. In a situation shitty enough that you're compelled to divulge incriminating secrets, you're boned whether you have another secret volume or not. Elsewhere in the FAQ they propose zeroing out unused space on your disk whenever travelling to totalitarian states that could demand decryption keys.

Re:TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification by danudey on Wednesday January 15, 2014 @01:31PM (#7065114)
> they propose zeroing out unused space on your disk whenever travelling to totalitarian states that could demand decryption keys.

Like the UK: http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2007/10/uk-can-now-demand...

Re:TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification by dzhiurgis on Thursday January 16, 2014 @05:55AM (#7068882)
Wait a minute.

If I zero out drive using traditional method - data is still recoverable.

If I zero out drive using random data - I can be suspect and/or get free rubber hose for life, trying to extract keys for something that doesn't even exist?

Re:TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification by jessaustin on Thursday January 16, 2014 @08:30AM (#7069237)
The authoritarians would like to be able to torture and imprison you based on nothing more than their whim, so that's why they set it up this way.

The authoritarians' apologists will probably note that to address your concerns, you should use random data first, to whatever extent you think will thwart recovery efforts, and then zero out your empty space.

Re:TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification by tlrobinson on Wednesday January 15, 2014 @01:08PM (#7064922)
I think on most operating systems the free space usually contains remnants of deleted files, not random data, unless you use some sort of secure deletion mechanism (srm, etc). If the free space of your volume contains truly random looking data then there would be reason to suspect a hidden volume.

Presumably that's not the case with TrueCrypt volume-within-a--volumes, but if you're using TrueCrypt there's already reason to suspect you might have hidden volumes.

It's impossible to prove the existence or nonexistence of hidden volumes, but that could be a good or bad thing depending on your adversary's willingness to jail/torture/kill you on suspicion alone.

I'm not aware of hidden volume software that integrates with "unsuspicious" file systems. Does something like that exist?