While it makes complete sense to use SHA-256 and beyond, a collision of two carefully constructed plaintexts is not indicative of a general break in SHA-1. It is much more difficult to find a collision against a fixed plaintext and hash and ridiculously more difficult for that collision to produce non-gibberish, working code that compiles and creates a vulnerability.
Reading your list of complications though I wonder if the last one is really a problem? Hiding a vulnerability that doesn't look suspicious on first sight? Agreed. But hiding a vulnerability at all - if compiled without reading the source? Isn't that 'just' appending /* garbage */ or even code in IFDEFs? In other words: Is the last point really an issue or is it 'just' a collection against a fixed plaintext/hash?
That said, I'm not sure how you'd go about crafting source code in such a way as to collide with a known hash without it being amazingly obvious. You could change history to make it appear as if your crocked code was always there or had been for a long time, but then you don't have to figure just one hash, then you have to figure every single hash down to the parent. Depending on the number of commits, that's a hell of a lot of work, even with an algorithm to break SHA1.
And even then if you change the hashes, since Git is distributed, the developers will quickly figure out that what's in one repo doesn't match all the others when patches start breaking..
[1] - https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/02/cryptanalysis...