> Also, a part of the social/political problem is that
> people tend to not know that the crypto they are using is
> bad, and political activists tend to not necessarily be
> cryptography experts either, so how would they know that
> they are in danger when everyone around them tells them
> that the broken crypto they are using is the thing to use?
But there is always going to be a problem with telling people "use our software and you can organise the overthrow of your government without fear". There is no way around the fact that people who are doing that need to understand the risks better than most people do.
(How are you supposed to blockquote text on HN?)
As for the fact that people who do risky things need to be a bit more cautious anyway: Well, yes, but that does not mean that they would not benefit if everyone knew which crypto tools are secure and how to use them, and in contrast to most of physical security, there really is not that much need to distinguish between "professional" and "end customer" tools - proofing your vault against bombs might be a bit more expensive than proofing it against a burglar, but secure cryptography does not need more expensive computers or anything like that.
And also no clue how you to quote here ... ;)
Also, a part of the social/political problem is that people tend to not know that the crypto they are using is bad, and political activists tend to not necessarily be cryptography experts either, so how would they know that they are in danger when everyone around them tells them that the broken crypto they are using is the thing to use?