The law was a horrifically complicated moronicy for a very specific reason that it is important to call out. The law was formulated to satisfy the numerous semi-monopolistic rent-taking interests already well entrenched in the field (especially the health insurance companies but also including other players. The final bill was written by an ex-high official of some big insurance company as I recall).
It is important to not ascribe anything like good intentions to those who went through this exercise. If we are very lucky, the new regime will allow hospitals and insurance companies to extract our money in a more orderly fashion and thus we may find ourselves benefiting in a relative sort of way. But we should never speak of better organized vampirehood as having a similarity to good intentions (the US will continue to spend twice what other industrialized nations spend on health care going forward).
What apparently was a genuine surprise was how many state governments were unwilling to set up their own exchanges, which was how things were originally envisioned to operate; having the federal government operate the exchanges was intended as a last resort. But even there, it was apparent in plenty of time how the wind was blowing.
And as to what it took to operate an exchange --- there was prior information there, too, in the form of a functioning exchange in Massachusetts. (Which hasn't been functioning so well this year in part because it's now required to integrate with the federal system, and that part has had severe teething trouble. But again, none of this should have been a surprise.)
This isn't meant as commentary on the specifics of the law. But as a left-leaning guy myself, I don't think there's a reasonable excuse for how they blew it (and, to his credit, Obama's not trying to make any).
But what we see here are major UI failures, availability problems, losing applications partway through the process and forcing people to start over, and inexplicably inconsistent results and behaviors. These are failures of execution.
They are, but in my opinion they happened because they tried to do a full on web site in a rush with outdated federal procurement and hostile stakeholders. The implementers and implementation were doomed.
There's a lot more to a web site fronting a huge federal program beyond mere technology.
They still don't. They outsourced it, first to Verizon, then to HP
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230356290...
The law itself was rushed through, to the point that the President and members who voted either way didn't really know what was in it. It was huge, and rushed because they had to beat the clock of the potential coming of a hostile Republican House. Even champions of the bill in Congress admitted that it would take years to fully understand what the bill does. The mind reels.
The law has many hostile stakeholders, and many turf grabbers, and the real requirements were not managed by a single entity who wanted to get it done the best and most economical way possible. Members of Congress (keepers of the purse) were and are fighting it at every turn. Government agencies had to have a piece of it, providing data for deciding customer eligibility and policy level; law enforcement and immigration concerns play a part. The requirements were a result of compromise (in the political sausage making sense) and turf dominance, some of which are part of any project, but at a hyper level when government agencies are involved. There was probably no technical adult in the room telling political people that this and that just can't be done in any economical and working way.
The government does not normally provide web sites to manage and coordinate anything between government, citizens and corporations on this scale. The most you'll usually see, from the outside as a citizen/consumer, is listing of information in text or pdf format, possibly filling in a form to make an appointment or communicate with a representative. They don't know what they're doing, in a profound sense and on a grand scale.
The government just doesn't have experience managing and running such a site with such requirements. They're trying to do something like Facebook in its current incarnation right from the start. It's like never having gone to the moon and strapping some astronauts on the top of an ICBM and hoping for the best, which is a formual to "fail fast" in the worst sense.
Because they didn't know what they were doing, and because it was probably thought of as just another IT contract effort, they followed standard procurement practices and used standard ("we know them") vendors. And that failed miserably.
And because of all of the above, and general inexperience for such a project, and relatively unlimited funds to get it as wrong as possible, they started actual specification and implementation way, way late, with the added complication that the possibility of a time overrun was just not there, because of a hard political deadline. It's no wonder that testing was done so poorly and ineptly, they just had no time at all.