Re:CryptoLocker's crimewave: A trail of millions in laundere...
by derekp7 on Sunday December 22, 2013 @10:12PM
(#6952920)
Ah, so instead of asking the user for permission to access something, an app also would need another app's permission to access that data. Of course, this has already been pioneered by companies implementing DRM, but still, I wonder how this can be implemented in a general sense.
Re:CryptoLocker's crimewave: A trail of millions in laundere...
by ufmace on Monday December 23, 2013 @10:27AM
(#6954687)
Er, what I meant is that Android already does this. All apps' data stores are private to that app by default. The only way for any other app to access them is for the owning app to specifically set up an interface and permissions to access it, and the accessing app to request those permissions at install time.
I don't have much experience with iOS, but I expect it does something similar.
Re:CryptoLocker's crimewave: A trail of millions in laundere...
by willvarfar on Monday December 23, 2013 @02:15AM
(#6953428)
Symbian and iOS had/have data caging; apps can't see each others data.
Capability-based security is ultimately just another buzzword, no more of a perfect solution than any of the others. I don't think you can call any type of security problem solved by your pet technology until it is deployed at scale in the real world and proven to work. Until you have had tens of millions of users and hundreds of thousands of developers bashing away at it for years, you just don't know if you've really solved the problem.
Android's capability-based security is good, but IMHO the more important security innovation is secure app-specific data stores. You might request more permissions than you should, and some clueless users might install it anyways, but you still can't ever get access to the data or credentials stored by the banking app, the social media app, etc.