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A comment on Transitioning the web to Namecoin by addressing name-squatters. Parent comment

Re:Transitioning the web to Namecoin by addressing name-squa... by itistoday2 on Sunday December 22, 2013 @05:20PM (#6952026)
This was brought up in the forums, and here was the reply:

Yes, this needs to be addressed. The proposal can be kept as-is with the following modification/addition:

In order to prevent such attacks, it could be required that transactions need be confirmed across N "different networks", where "different networks" can be measured by some metric (IP2location, the first two octets of an IPv4 address, etc.). The value for N can be based as a percentage of the number of nodes running in the past 48 hours, or some other means.

Copied from here: http://dot-bit.org/forum/viewtopic.php?p=7746#p7746

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Re:Transitioning the web to Namecoin by addressing name-squa... by DennisP on Sunday December 22, 2013 @08:11PM (#6952537)
Hm. I suppose if each node connects to a large number of DNS servers scattered around the internet, that would help a lot.
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Re:Transitioning the web to Namecoin by addressing name-squa... by itistoday2 on Monday December 23, 2013 @11:26AM (#6955023)
Yes, that's one way, although I think it would be safer for the verification to be done by other peers (on the answers provided by other peers), as opposed to peers doing it themselves by connecting to many DNS servers. The reason being the possibility that the traffic on a network is controlled entirely by an adversary, and thus all outgoing connections to port 53 (via UDP) could get routed to the same IP, regardless of what the destination IP actually is.
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