Re:RSA Key Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Acoustic Cryptanalysis
by sneak on Wednesday December 18, 2013 @08:13PM
(#6932248)
These attacks are specifically for the operations involved in repeated use of long-term RSA keys, and Bitcoin uses ECDSA keys a relatively small number of times, so the attacks would be materially different.
However, I would not bet against the fact that your machine outputs "compromising emanations" (be they acoustic or RF or otherwise) leaking _some_ information about your bitcoin keys.
There is less opportunity to execute such an attack in the bitcoin universe, though, as bitcoin-qt doesn't reuse keys that much. (When you send a payment, the "change" difference is sent to a new key.)
It's something to think about, but the attack surface is a lot smaller. Perhaps there's something specific in the ECDSA algorithm that may make it easier or harder? I don't have the requisite mathematical understanding of elliptic curves to know how they're executed in-CPU.
However, I would not bet against the fact that your machine outputs "compromising emanations" (be they acoustic or RF or otherwise) leaking _some_ information about your bitcoin keys.
There is less opportunity to execute such an attack in the bitcoin universe, though, as bitcoin-qt doesn't reuse keys that much. (When you send a payment, the "change" difference is sent to a new key.)
It's something to think about, but the attack surface is a lot smaller. Perhaps there's something specific in the ECDSA algorithm that may make it easier or harder? I don't have the requisite mathematical understanding of elliptic curves to know how they're executed in-CPU.