Re:Harvard Student Charged In Bomb Hoax
by anigbrowl on Wednesday December 18, 2013 @01:45AM
(#6926239)
I do appreciate the arguments about why anonymity matters. You might find it interesting to consider the similarities fo debates about services like the penet remailer (http://www.textfiles.com/hacking/INTERNET/na.txt and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penet_remailer).
With time, I've come to the conclusion that the ability to (re*-create such tools is more important than any individual instance of such a tool.
Re:Harvard Student Charged In Bomb Hoax
by mindslight on Wednesday December 18, 2013 @01:34PM
(#6929508)
I've come to the opposite conclusion. Adopted systems in continual use are what is important. I could setup any number of service 'anonymizers' within a day, but if an individual operator can even be short-term trusted, they certainly can't be relied on. Only by getting an overwhelming number of not-heavily-invested node operators can one bootstrap reliable trust.
I want to live in a world where the routine use is anonymous, with nyms only connected voluntarily. Of course people have to be smart enough to not post 'my name is XXX' in-band, but they shouldn't have to go to a distant coffee shop. If privacy takes work, that means it's only accessible to the few willing to put in that work, and will be viewed as an aberration by everyone else. It's only by making it easily accessible to everyone that it can become societally accepted.
Back to the technical, isn't this the point of Tor "bridges" ? Of course these don't work out of the box - they require finding out the address of one out-of-band and manually configuring it. Wider casual adoption of Tor would have also fixed the problem in this case (if the resulting Tor user list was too long to question everybody).
The whole point is that ending up on a shortlist means you are essentially caught. This kid may have gotten off by playing it cool. But translated into the dissident scenario, it's still a loss.
Given the proliferation of surveillance cameras, the coffee shop scenario becomes much harder. Assuming after-the-fact facial recognition is standard these days, it would only work if there were enough other Harvard students also on tape. Low latency is the mortal enemy of mix networks.