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Re:NSA phone surveillance program likely unconstitutional, f... by thucydides on Monday December 16, 2013 @11:12PM (#6919591)
> If Smith v. Maryland is to be overturned...

The Supreme Court wouldn't necessarily be deciding whether Smith v. Maryland should be overturned, but whether NSA collection of phone/SMS metadata can be distinguished from Smith. The district judge here presents some excellent arguments that Smith is fundamentally different, and I was disappointed to read Professor Kerr's very sloppy analysis, given how excellent his Fourth Amendment coverage usually is. Perhaps he did not have a chance to read the case carefully.

Brief background on Smith v. Maryland: In Smith, a robbery victim complained to police that she was continually receiving threatening and obscene phone calls. The phone company installed a pen register at police request, without a warrant or court order, to record metadata for about 2 weeks; this revealed the phone numbers of all subsequent callers to her home. It also revealed that Smith made another harassing phone call. In short, the Supreme Court ruled that, in the process of calling, Smith voluntarily transmitted the phone numbers he dialed to the phone company, information he and everyone else know are commonly stored as business records, so he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed. Therefore, the Fourth Amendment didn't apply.

Contrary to Professor Kerr's blog post, the real reasons Judge Leon thinks the NSA's metadata collection is different are quite compelling. Here's my summary of his reasons from pages 42-56:

1. Smith surveillance was only for 2 weeks; NSA surveillance is for as long as terrorism lasts in the United States (forever?)

2. Previous case law supports a distinction on the basis of time length: In US v. Knotts (1983), the Court said police use of a tracking beeper on an automobile does not implicate the Fourth Amendment because we have no reasonable expectation of privacy in our movement on public streets. But last year in US v. Jones, the Court distinguished Knotts, which was about short-term tracking, saying that police installation of a GPS device on Jones's car for a month was too long and violated Jones's reasonable expectation of privacy.

3. In Smith there was no indication the phone records would be kept; NSA keeps phone records for 5 years

4. Smith was a one-time, targeted request; the NSA program is a daily, all-encompassing, indiscriminate dump of phone metadata. Leon: "It's one thing to say people expect phone companies to occasionally provide information to law enforcement; it is quite another to suggest that our citizens expect all phone companies to operate...a joint intelligence-gathering operation with the Government."

5. The Smith Court did not foresee in 1979 the "almost-Orwellian technology" the NSA is using to track and store hundreds of millions of Americans' phone data.

6. "Most importantly," the nature of the information in our telephony metadata is much different.

7. Phones are ubiquitous and much more frequently used, so metadata reveals more about our private lives and implicates a bigger privacy interest than in 1979.

8. SMS metadata reveals who we wrote to, information that would not have been available in 1979 phone metadata when we had to write letters.

Judge Leon's conclusion, which I think is compelling given the foregoing: "I cannot navigate these uncharted Fourth Amendment waters using as my North Star a case that predates the rise of cell phones."

Re:NSA phone surveillance program likely unconstitutional, f... by bradleyjg on Tuesday December 17, 2013 @05:07AM (#6920347)
I see you are an attorney, so I'll skip the detailed explanation of vertical stare decisis and simply point out that Sotomayor joined Scalia's opinion in Jones, which commanded a majority and was the opinion of the Court. Therefore, the holding of the case has to do with the continuing validity of traditional trespass as a fourth amendment search, and the mosaic theory in the concurrence is dicta. I personally find it compelling, but I'm not a District Court judge bound by the strictures of precedent.

Nothing in Smith itself or it's Supreme Court progeny indicate that the length of time the government intends to keep information that it found the people have no reasonable expectation of privacy in is of constitutional moment. Nor the number of phones, or how frequently they are used. As for SMS and writing letters, it is the Court's allowing the government to collect mail metadata (the envelope info) that got this entire line of precedents started.

If this had been an email case, I'd be right there with you. I don't think the device that the government wanted to install in the Lavabit case is sufficiently similar to a classic pen register to be covered by Smith, and I think the third party and his representations matter with respect to customers' expectations. But here we have telephone records as collected by telephone companies. Smith is squarely on point. Limiting Smith to 1979 is tantamount to overruling it, not distinguishing it.

Judge Leon doesn't like Smith, I get that, I don't either. Fortunately or unfortunately, neither if us is on the Supreme Court. (See also, Reinhardt, J. any opinion.)

Re:NSA phone surveillance program likely unconstitutional, f... by thucydides on Tuesday December 17, 2013 @11:02AM (#6921795)
It's possible to distinguish Smith as inapposite without throwing away stare decisis. The term of surveillance (forever), the breadth of surveillance (almost every American), and the greater privacy intrusion (because of cell phones' ubiquity and because we use them more frequently) all make NSA surveillance very different from Smith.

And as far as the length of surveillance goes, Kerr's pointed out that 5 justices in Jones (the 2012 GPS case) signed onto the idea that long-term GPS monitoring of a car counts as a search even if short-term monitoring does not.

Re:NSA phone surveillance program likely unconstitutional, f... by repsilat on Tuesday December 17, 2013 @04:54AM (#6920313)
> Smith voluntarily transmitted the phone numbers he dialed to the phone company, information he and everyone else know are commonly stored as business records

I think I can understand and agree with this. I'm not sure what I think about the phone company disclosing these records to other people. Regardless of its actual legality, I think the distribution of that data could be a breach of trust.

It is entirely reasonable for my phone company to know who I'm calling, but I still expect that data to be "relatively private". I would be upset if my neighbours could get it from the phone company. I would be upset if the phone company mailed that data to me on a postcard. I think we should be similarly upset if the police can get hold of it without a court order.

How does the law address this? Is that information just not disclosed "in confidence"? Does the law follow a "genie out of the bottle" logic, whereby information that is not absolutely private is not private at all? Or do law enforcement agencies have a privileges regarding otherwise private information?

Re:NSA phone surveillance program likely unconstitutional, f... by bwaldrep on Tuesday December 17, 2013 @02:16PM (#6923167)
From US v Miller as cited in Smith v Maryland:

"The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government. . . . This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed."

US v Miller: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1505272929564347...

Smith v Maryland: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3033726127475530...

Re:NSA phone surveillance program likely unconstitutional, f... by repsilat on Tuesday December 17, 2013 @07:43PM (#6925056)
I guess that makes sense again -- I don't have a problem with them "obtaining" the data, and a voluntary disclosure certainly shouldn't be called a "search". If the government asks for the data and the telco willingly complies with the request then I don't think the government has done anything that should be illegal (though it's not very nice of them.)

Two caveats, though: Even if the government is in the clear for obtaining the data, I'm not so sure the telco has a (moral) leg to stand on. We should consider making the distribution of that information illegal, if it isn't already. I have no idea if this would make the government's request "incitement", though I guess the answer might lie somewhere around the civil/criminal distinction. I'm clearly not a lawyer, so I can't really pretend to understand the likely forms or consequences of any of this...

The second caveat is that if the government compels the telco to hand the data over then it's a completely different ball game. That is a (plain-language) search, and it would be disappointing if that weren't subject to Fourth Amendment protections.