Re:“We cannot trust” Intel and Via’s chip-based crypto, Free...
by ars_technician on Tuesday December 10, 2013 @09:20PM
(#6885460)
How easy is to detect off-by-one errors looking at assembly?
Re:“We cannot trust” Intel and Via’s chip-based crypto, Free...
by pg_is_a_butt on Tuesday December 10, 2013 @02:31PM
(#6883059)
assembly language is not an extremely concrete representation of a program if the hardware is engineered with backdoors which is exactly what this article suggests is happening.
if some specific set of registers is set a certain way followed by a very specific series of commands, there is no practical way to prove that the hardware is doing what it should.
Re:“We cannot trust” Intel and Via’s chip-based crypto, Free...
by tptacek on Tuesday December 10, 2013 @02:33PM
(#6883074)
You are talking about a wildly different threat model than this little section of the thread is talking about.
Meanwhile: if you can't trust the hardware, you can't trust C code either.
It's possible to write obfuscated assembly, of course, but it sticks out as obfuscated.
To further get your head around the lack of cover compiled code would give a backdoor, it's worth knowing that Hopper will give you serviceable C-ish code from x86_64 for... let me check here... fifty nine bucks.
(It's possible that my only message with that last graf is "Hopper is great").