Re:Further improving digital certificate security
by dlgeek on Sunday December 08, 2013 @01:12PM
(#6870543)
My understanding is that Chrome only cares about this sort of thing when it's a CA in the default trust store that shouldn't be impersonating them. User-added certs like in your example are fine, because explicit action was taken.
See Adam Langley's blog about this here: https://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/05/04/pinning.html
Re:Further improving digital certificate security
by gwu78 on Sunday December 08, 2013 @01:26PM
(#6870630)
"... user installed root CAs are given the authority to override pins."
This is the answer I was seeking. Thank you!
Re:Further improving digital certificate security
by comex on Sunday December 08, 2013 @11:39AM
(#6870138)
You can also write a Chrome extension to monitor traffic:
Re:Further improving digital certificate security
by benmmurphy on Sunday December 08, 2013 @11:30AM
(#6870110)
i believe chrome uses NSS which can be configured by environment variable to dump session keys
https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Psst+Your+Browser+Knows+Al...
Re:Further improving digital certificate security
by gwu78 on Sunday December 08, 2013 @12:19PM
(#6870293)
Does this require a writeable, user-accessible file on the computer where the browser is installed? (versus, e.g., a gateway computer the user controls that can run openssl, the proxy, tcpdump and the packet filter)
If yes, how would the NSS solution work if the user is browsing from a device that hides and even tries to deny the user access to the filesystem, like one of today's smartphones or tablets?
Meet User B. User B has the same basic computer skills as User A, but User B uses the Chrome browser. Thanks to "certificate pinning", User B cannot monitor what is being sent from her computer to Google.
User B wants to see what is being sent to and from her computer by Google. Can she do this and still use Chrome?