Wrong. It had huge consequences. Users within the French administration lost their ability to securely communicate with Google and who knows what other sites. Additionally, the overall network security was hit by another blow against the SSL trust infrastructure.
This is a seriously bad issue and downplaying hopefully won't do them any good. "We only spied in a very sneaky way on our employees, undermining the trust given us by all browser and OS vendors. Don't worry. Nothing to see here. Too bad we got caught - if we hadn't, we'd just continue".
By having their root accepted into the browsers stores, they took on a huge responsibility which they have now betrayed and IMHO it doesn't matter whether that was the root or one of their intermediates: if they can't control them, they never should have issued these intermediate certificates.
Browser vendors need to set an example and do a Diginotar here: remove that root from the stores. There are already too many supposedly trusted and hopefully competent ones in there, no need for the devious or incompetent ones.
Unfortunately, if the answer to that question is "yes", and the offense triggering removal is "improperly delegated a CA certificate for internal network use", precedent dictates that the CA will not be removed. See: Trustwave.
I don't like it any more than you do, but it's helpful to know what reality looks like.
I just found Diginotar certificates in FF 25.0.1. So no "Diginotar" has been done in FF. At least not what I'd call a "Diginotar": Remove all certs of that organization.
Have you manually added Diginotar back? Has some malware added Diginotar back?
Anyway, here is the answer of the French Ministry of Finance, who was issuing the certificate (or more exactly, by the ANSSI, but the cert for the the Ministry of Finance):
http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/en/the-anssi/events/revocation-of-an-...