I'm interested in bitmessage but it being unvetted / not heavily reviewed gives me pause. Do you have any doubts about the design (that can't be easily solved)?
Cheers, wc
Regarding your last question, if someone throws an FPGA at the PoW algorithm, they could flood the network with a lot of data and that concerns me. And, as mentioned above, deciding when to use child streams in the context of a hostile environment remains and open question.
-Atheros
I found your paper here: https://anonfiles.com/file/849506ebab91aa0ab90e98fc539446a2
It lacks a "summation of attacks that are possible on bitmessage" or "solutions on how to prevent such attacks."
I like that you tried to add a feature where users could choose their own anonymity/usability balance. "Users should be able to choose to remain anonymous or to disclose (partial) address information and be a ’light’ client." 200MB a day just for headers is a little bit much for a mobile 'light' client. If the protocol supports sending only headers based on a filter then why bother supporting headers? The "seeding" node could just supply a list of body messages to download that pass a filter. This would also mean that no one ever has to sync headers.
To just take two examples:
-Every bitmessage user can be mitm'd by their ISP. (yes, I know about tor).
-Every bitmessage user could have only bad peers connecting to them when peers aggressively try to connect to their client.
These are two examples of attacks that work on bitmessage, that are addressed in the libertymail proposal, and for which a possible solution is given.
forward secrecy is helped by 2 things: you cannot know who is the recipient of a message, so if you want to store the messages to be able to decrypt them in the future when you'll have obtained their private key, you'd have to store all the network messages
If you're worried by such an attacker, you can just create a new identity for each message, just like you can create a new bitcoin address for each transaction
Pond seems interesting, but quite different from bitmessage, especially I like bitmessage because of its user-friendliness (the UI needs lots of improvement, but you just download it, create an identity and off you go... I doubt about the feasibility of getting the whole world to use TOR, especially people in China/Iran or "my parents")
> If you're worried by such an attacker [...]
Uh, shouldn't everyone be at this point?
> you can just create a new identity for each message
Key exchange and management is hard. That's why you try not to do it often. You could claim PGP e-mail was forward secret: All you need to do is use a new private key every time.
moreover, since the keypair and the BM identity is one-and-the-same the key exchange and management comes for free, once you got the first message sent to your recipient... changing identity is much easier than creating a new gpg keypair and sending it to the other guy, and on top of that you'll get some added anonimity
-Atheros / Jonathan (creator of Bitmessage)