News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Bitmessage – Send messages without leaking metadata by p4bl0 on Saturday December 07, 2013 @02:31PM (#6867334)
I read a while back that BitMessage's security is easily breakable. See http://secupost.net/3240982275/bitmessage-security.
Re:Bitmessage – Send messages without leaking metadata by dmunoz on Saturday December 07, 2013 @02:52PM (#6867422)
This relied on being able to send lots of messages, and having the user visit a link contained in them. The first issue can be fixed by upping the proof of work required to send a message, although this will not stop a determined attacker who has lots of cycles to throw at the problem. As for the second issue, users should not be visiting links from addresses they do not trust. As with most anonymity systems, it is only as good as you treat it.
Re:Bitmessage – Send messages without leaking metadata by derefr on Saturday December 07, 2013 @03:31PM (#6867562)
> The first issue can be fixed by upping the proof of work required to send a message, although this will not stop a determined attacker who has lots of cycles to throw at the problem.

Could you implement something like IRC's "flood prevention" in a proof-of-work based consensus algorithm -- so sending messages closer together costs prohibitively more?

The network could require, say, the work in a transaction to be proportional to ∑(1/message dt) for the messages signed by the transaction.

Re:Bitmessage – Send messages without leaking metadata by Pavitra on Saturday December 07, 2013 @04:36PM (#6867795)
> Could you implement something like IRC's "flood prevention" in a proof-of-work based consensus algorithm -- so sending messages closer together costs prohibitively more?

This seems easily circumvented by creating lots of identities. Though maybe creating an identity could be costly?

Re:Bitmessage – Send messages without leaking metadata by 3pt14159 on Saturday December 07, 2013 @02:54PM (#6867435)
Not really security, more like spam prevention and idiots clicking links.