This can be good or bad, depending on who those respective parties are.
I've not heard of any TPM that has some other owner, like the claims against TPMs have said. TPMs aren't needed to provide a DRM scenario - UEFI Secure Boot can do that by itself, right?
The design of the TPM prevents the user from ever fully controlling it, so complete revocation of access is unnecessary. Anything in the system/bootup can update a PCR, revoking some or all access to essential keys.
Take the chromebook I am using right now. The user can disable secureboot (which isn't actually implemented with the TPM) and use an unsigned image, but can not create an image signed by themselves.
With either boot, I nominally have control of the TPM, so far so good. But the PCR values written by the boot process will be different so I can not use keys from one boot in the other. For example, my encrypted filesystems from the google boot are inaccessible.
This is great for the security of my data if my chromebook is stolen. But it also means a web service like my companies' VPN or MPAA's movie server could demand that I use attestment to show I am using a google configured chromebook, if I did a custom boot the attestment will not have the right PCR values, so I am incapable of using the service.
> TPMs aren't needed to provide a DRM scenario - UEFI Secure Boot can do that by itself, right?
AFAIK, UEFI secure boot limits the device based on a list of public keys, but has no access to any form of secret key. So booting an insecure clone to contact a DRM protected service (or otherwise emulate the secured device) works perfectly fine.
On Secure Boot, you're right that a clone works. But if your device doesn't have an open Secure Boot system, like WinRT, then that device is DRM'd up as the OS can fully decide which programs to allow. An insecure clone means another device, but point taken.
I think the permanently gimped system stuff like a key restricted secure boot is really something else. It is in some sense an acknowledgment of the impossibility of DRM actually preventing every single copier and gains more from leveraging its play time monopoly to lower the value of all non-DRM content which may or may not be pirated.
A system that denied all open content with a TPM would indeed be very broken in terms of design and would only start to make sense if the hardware was much more customized than a typical PC platform.
Using a preinstalled Intel+MS private key for my ssh does not make sense.
I've clarified how it works here: http://blog.habets.se/2013/12/How-TPM-protected-SSH-keys-wor...
For the average person, a TPM with a technology like BitLocker is a good way to protect your data. If you have compliance requirements or real secrets to keep, you need to understand your implementation in detail.
I want to know this too. Last I ever heard about TPM was that Treacherous Computing campaign which said that TPM was supposed to be the ultimate DRM scheme which was supposed to lock you out of your media, files, and the computer if it didn't like what you were doing.
Picture of what I am talking about: http://i.imgur.com/83ekRBz.jpg
Assuming no foul play, I think a combination of TPM (Hardware based Keys), Secure boot and Open source encryption should be enough to keep your data safe from any prying eyes.