http://philosecurity.org/2009/01/12/interview-with-an-adware...
Don't tell me you aren't familiar with this.
I do agree, though, Windows is a desktop machine OS and has a vastly larger exploitation surface area.
The level of defense - in this case an air gap - raised cost and risk. That added back bag job to plant the infection, or a bribed operator to the cost and risk. If the SCADA software ran in a VM as a guest OS, and booted from read-only media, stuxnet might not have taken hold, and the bribed operator might have been discovered by forensics on isolated infected systems.
At some point the cost and/or risk exceeds the value of the target or a reasonable threshold for the chance of success. Even when you have infinite money, you don't have infinite time or infinite risk tolerance.
Selinux / apparmor, lxc (or similar), better aslr, daemons usually defaulting to separate users, many other things... There are many security layers so trivial to apply these days that it's really a failure not to. Sure - you can still find zero-days (or may be already sitting on a pile of them), but I get an impression that it's much harder to take over the whole system these days if anyone spent a couple of minutes just to tweak the defaults.