Re:Internet architects propose encrypting all the world's we...
by AnthonyMouse on Saturday November 16, 2013 @10:56AM
(#6745138)
I think the focus on the dichotomy between the header and the body is misguided. If you separate them then an attacker can't attack the header using the body, but that's just inviting the attacker to find a way to insert data into the header to attack other header fields, or find secrets in the body that shouldn't be revealed.
Also, it seems like you could get the same benefit as using a separate key and encryption context by just padding the header to a block boundary.
The real problem with these attacks is that they aren't attacks on the cipher at all. You could be using a one time pad and the attacks would still be effective. What they really are is an attack on content-revealing efficiency. The only defense is to prevent the length of the message from depending on the existence of matches between attacker-supplied plaintext and secrets, and doing that in a way that allows non-cryptographer web developers to not screw it up basically comes down this: You have to disable TLS protocol compression. It exists at the wrong layer of abstraction because the TLS layer doesn't know what data is acceptable to compress against what other data.
But you still want to use compression, so the compression has to exist at a higher level in the stack, i.e. in HTTP or even HTML, where the web developer can specify exactly which data has come from an untrustworthy source so that it won't be compressed against secrets.
Also, it seems like you could get the same benefit as using a separate key and encryption context by just padding the header to a block boundary.
The real problem with these attacks is that they aren't attacks on the cipher at all. You could be using a one time pad and the attacks would still be effective. What they really are is an attack on content-revealing efficiency. The only defense is to prevent the length of the message from depending on the existence of matches between attacker-supplied plaintext and secrets, and doing that in a way that allows non-cryptographer web developers to not screw it up basically comes down this: You have to disable TLS protocol compression. It exists at the wrong layer of abstraction because the TLS layer doesn't know what data is acceptable to compress against what other data.
But you still want to use compression, so the compression has to exist at a higher level in the stack, i.e. in HTTP or even HTML, where the web developer can specify exactly which data has come from an untrustworthy source so that it won't be compressed against secrets.