Let me lay out the argument from our post in a more technical way: the biggest problem with the Eyal/Sirer paper is that they don't think about the problem as an equilibrium problem, but rather argue about what's best from the perspective of a particular player. This leads them to propose a strategy which is not even optimal for any player (we prefer to think of Bitcoin as a kind of consensus game, in the game theoretic sense. See our earlier paper on the topic [1]).
They argue that Bitcoin is not incentive-compatible by virtue of the strategy they demonstrate. I think this question needs to be the crux of any Bitcoin research paper. I'll define "incentive compatible" to mean one of two things
(1) (weakly incentive compatible) If people follow their incentives, rather than the rules of Bitcoin as written down and understood by the community, then there exists an equilibrium in which all players follow the rules.
(2) (strongly incentive compatible) The above equilibrium is the only equilibrium in Bitcoin.
The question of whether the current Bitcoin ruleset is incentive compatible strikes me as the most important Bitcoin research question: it answers whether Bitcoin, as a system, will continue to be stable over the long term. A secondary question is to ask "what rule sets could exist which would be incentive compatible?" Obviously, if the answer to the first question is "no" then the second question is more important.
I also agree that the Eyal/Sirer paper seems naive about markets.
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PS. This thread should be at the top of this page. (Currently, another thread I started is at the top; I hope this thread shoots up past it.)
But my assessment of his post is descriptive, not normative. When you respond to a detailed technical report by criticizing the way it was presented to the press, then suggest technical flaws without actually explaining what those flaws are, that is innuendo.
Maybe you feel innuendo is warranted. Whether the mining game in Bitcoin is or isn't tenable over the long term doesn't much matter to me, because I'm one of those people who feel Bitcoin has no intrinsic value, and has a spot price today that represents in part irrational excitement about Bitcoin and in part a cynical scalping of that excitement by speculators. Bitcoin could be the most solid imaginable distributed cryptosystem and I'd still have problems with it.
I was motivated to comment about Andresen's post because I was also struck by his Reddit comment on the ES paper, where it seemed that random laypeople on Reddit were better prepared to discuss the technical implications of the paper than he was.
Is a Democratic Republic incentive compatible over the long term?
In the ES paper, and in your responses, the assumption is a colluding group of miners. I find myself agreeing with you there; it looks like the colluders have more incentive to break ranks. But suppose a single individual controlled 33%. Couldn't they use this same strategy to benefit more than we previously thought they could?
Yes, I think they could. I'm currently trying to model what happens in mining pools where the pool master attempts to keep the pool's state a secret from the pool members to deter the kind of hopping behavior necessary for fair weather mining.
Our argument is that the protocol, as stated, is not incentive compatible. That's ironic, because the protocol, as stated, is offered as an argument that Bitcoin is not incentive compatible.
Bitcoin attempts to create a protocol that doesn't require trust between parties, but needs to robust against large groups (e.g. blocks of Chinese) who trust each other. So I don't think it's ironic that the ES attack is not incentive compatible, nor do I think it's really a flaw.
The reason this doesn't prevent defection is that while you can produce a provable commitment that you're mining with the ES miners in one moment, all other moments you can be defecting and sharing the ES state with your friends.
Still, I would have liked to see a more technical rebuttal from Mr. Felten, so I hope he posts more in the near future. I don't see how being a fairweather miner like he describes is an issue. Pools already employ strong protections that prevent pool-hoppers from gaining anything.
I started implementing a simulation of the attack last night in an attempt to reproduce their results.
[1] http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/1q22kg/a_start_to_r...
http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/1puk1a/arxiv_paper_...
You can't know ahead of time which pool to bet on, unless you know that the ES pool is ahead. There's nothing guaranteeing that pool miners are decentralized, in fact by design they would have to be centralized to keep completed blocks private.
If they were public they could be neutered by one rouge agent in the pool that immediately publishes completed blocks. So you have no way of knowing how far ahead an ES mining pool is. So on what grounds could you decide which pool to help?
If you see it work on top of yet another block that is not published, it's probably two ahead, and so on.
You of course, can't just connect and immediately know, but if you watch the pool (as a miner) you can figure it out.
The Bitcoin paper at least presented a thorough argument. Andresen, who did not seem (in his Bitcoin Reddit post) to have grasped that argument, is obviously unhappy that "Bitcoin" didn't get a preprint or approve its presentation to the press. But the authors of the paper signed their name to it; the lead author is a lecturer at a serious university.
Instead of rebutting any technical point the paper makes, Andresen casts aspersions, alludes to a "peer review" process that would not have prevented the paper's publication, and then suggests the paper is flawed technically. Well, how?
Here, instead, is a vastly superior critical response by Ed Felten:
https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/bitcoin-isnt-so-br...