If indeed Google does not know then it's just another sign of security failures at the company. Nobody is perfect and security incidents do happen. A good security will have in-depth defense and built-in monitoring/audit measure that would at the very least allow you to determine what have happened post-factum.
Do you have your own data center building? And if you don't have your own data center buildings, how are you guarding against physical attacks? Because just saying "encryption" doesn't actually mean anything. Encryption isn't free, and at Google scale that can add up. Useless encryption is just wasted power
> For example, I don't want our system administrators to have an easy way to look at the traffic: yes, it is still possible to do but it is harder and requires some very unusual actions that will trigger alerts everywhere.
That can be accomplished in many ways that don't involve encryption. And your servers are all capable of decrypting the data at some point, so you still have to trust your sys admins and/or have alternative systems in place as they still have access to the unencrypted data.
> A good security will have in-depth defense and built-in monitoring/audit measure that would at the very least allow you to determine what have happened post-factum.
How, exactly, do you detect cable splicing? Much less audit said splicing? You seem to be asking for a hell of a lot more than "good security"
Some types of encryption are pretty cheap actually. I used to use special SSL cards in the servers 10-15 years ago but today my laptop would outperform these cards and wouldn't even get hot :) Plus you need to remember that relatively expensive public key encryption needs to be done only for key exchange. After that you run block or stream cyphers and those algorithms tend to be really fast.
So far I haven't seen any evidences that there was cable splicing. Thus using occam's razor I would assume that the hack was much simpler than that. To detect the issue, I would start from reviewing the visitors log to the data center (assuming there is a visitor log).
I'll re-iterate that security should be built on defense-in-depth principle. Every single protection layer will fail or someone will go around it. The assumption that a data center is "safe" is a bad assumption period. You have to play "what-if" game and think for the attacker.
What? The evidence totally points to cable splicing. What hack involves getting all the inter-DC packets but nothing else? Obviously the machines weren't compromised, or they wouldn't have cared about reverse-engineering the wire protocol. So what are you proposing was hacked?
> I'll re-iterate that security should be built on defense-in-depth principle. Every single protection layer will fail or someone will go around it. The assumption that a data center is "safe" is a bad assumption period. You have to play "what-if" game and think for the attacker.
And I'll re-iterate that you're asking for a goddamn magical pony.
Side note, if your data center isn't safe go get a new one. Seriously. Most DCs have tons of security to make them safe. That's not an assumption.
I don't think there are any evidences at all. As far as I know, the only known thing is that NSA was able to obtain the un-encrypted google traffic. For example, it could have been backdoor in the router, one extra cable in the switch, or a few other similar low-tech options.
> Most DCs have tons of security to make them safe.
Don't disagree. But this doesn't make them invincible from other attack vectors (e.g. rogue employees). I actually heard the same argument from quite a few people during interviews and I usually don't hire them because you have to be paranoid to get security right :)
And "discussed" is not accurate. It was proposed by a few but rejected by most as paranoid.
So when someone says: "You're just being paranoid", my reply will be: "Better paranoid than wrong."
You don't use telnet when you access your home server(s) from your laptop ... that's basically what they were doing.
They skipped over a zero-cost, obvious best practice, and I think we should be suspicious. Either they've run that part of their network in a stunningly negligent fashion ... or this was the ingress they gave to the NSA which could be plausibly denied later.
This was a point-to-point cable. The only access possible was physical, by digging it up and splicing it.
Obviously that attack was possible, but arguing that this is somehow "the same kind of attack" as running tcpdump on a router to sniff packets is just insane, sorry.
"The" government? The lines were also being tapped by organized crime, China, France, etc. Google severely failed at data protection.
The assumption isn't bad - it's a private network line, not a public internet connection. Nobody else had access to that line, at least they weren't supposed to. Splicing a fiber line is a bit outside the scope of your random attacker. You can't blame Google for not anticipating a hostile break-in by the government. The discussion should absolutely, 100% be directed at the NSA here. To accept that a private network connection is open season for the government to tap is batshit insane.
> Moreover, it is not clear if other governments or criminals also had access to the users' data (e.g. in Google's data centers located outside of the US). So far Google did not produce any public post-mortem thus we have no clue how bad was the problem.
How is Google supposed to tell you if they themselves didn't know?
Although from the leaks it sounds like everyone is fucked thanks to the GCHQ and the NSA getting friendly with each other.