2. I just tell you what works in real life. Blocking 500 supernodes (out of 5000 machines botnet) is basically a non-issue for linux iptables on usual modern processes. Other 4500 are usually pretty tame in terms of firewall processing power.
3. You didn't propose that, it's what we do (and what works best for these attacks). Its rate of false positives is sufficiently low. Folks behind NATs don't use sustained 4 connections per user, so it's usually a non-issue either.
4. Well, you're wrong if you don't think so. Mitigating DDOS-es is one of the things i do for living [i'm in charge of web infrastructure of certain political opposition websites in Russia, if it rings any bells]. The scenarios i described is what actually happens.
About 4, are the DDoS aimed at your servers or at your office infrastructure?
Their DDOS attacks target our servers. For example, Russia has some issues with Estonia, opposition sites post some independent statements and news on that. Then comes DDOS.
It's called "delayed ack" or something. Iirc, it's all described in rfc793.
2. I am not sure I got what you say. In a real DDoS attack, there should be a lot of different IP addresses and blocking thousands of them (many of whom would reset connection and come back with a different IP) would make the life of the firewall very uncomfortable.
3. I know this has problems with proxies and firewalls with large number of computers behind them. I don't remember proposing this idea.
4. It all depends on what is being attacked and how. I don't think any serious DDoS attacker would use this approach.