In the construction industry, a contract might not explicitly say that the building has to comply with local building, fire and electrical codes - that's taken as a given. To construct a web site that deals with sensitive information without taking security into account is like building a skyscraper with no fire exits - not something that any honest or competent builder would do.
Relying on the honesty or competency of your contractors go above & beyond their requirements is an inefficient and unsustainable solution in a free market. This is a clear case of Moral Hazard: In the same way that bad money drives out good, corner-cutting organizations out-compete honest ones.
In the public construction industry, every contract includes that language. It's superfluous, because no contractor that wants to keep his license violates those codes (all construction is inspected by local authorities).
Furthermore, in construction, those codes exist and are easily incorporated into contracts by reference, even non specifically ("all work will comply with local building codes and statutes"). Also, the liability for non-compliance, even if undetected by inspectors, is massive.
In the tech industry, I've seen "work will be performed to professional standards and best practices" and other such meaningless clauses, intended to give the contractee some standing for complaint if they aren't happy later, but it's hard or impossible to measure compliance to generic standards that mostly don't exist.
This is one reason why Engineers say that dorking around on computers isn't Engineering. They do have a point.
FIPS actually exist and are easily incorporated into contracts by reference.
That's because you have to have a license to perform that work. If you don't meet the code, you don't keep your license.
This is one of the reasons why McConnell et al have argued that we need professional licensure. Licensed Professional Engineers can lose their licenses if they sign off on half-assed plans.
You can, and people do, and they are cited for it when caught.
Likewise, there are mandatory standards for Federal IT systems, particularly in the area of security.
So if I had to guess, if they didn't protect the data then it's likely those controls were notin place everyone knew they were not and the agency heads said it was ok. All fed systems get tested, and the system certifier is supposed to be an impartial reporter of the facts (these are the vulns, missing controls, risks, etc. and they are almost always impartial). They report those to the DAA along with a recommendation to approve or not approve the system to operate. Given how important this system was, I highly doubt anyone would not have issued the ATO no matter what vulns it had. And that's not to pick on this system, sadly slap dash rush ATOs happen far too often in the USG.
If you spend a ton of time and money on a system, execs in the USG have their careers on the line to show that wasn't wasted and since they don't understand security it all seems like science fiction to them. They almost always ATO the system. And why not, no USG exec has ever been fired for having a poorly protected system broken into.
growupkids: Which is also true in government contracting.
"Public-sector" = "government".
Imagine a bank (well just an account), on the functional level, you just need to deposit and withdraw money. The fact that they have to secure it is a huge constraint, but at the functional level we're not far from a trash can, a parking lot or a gas tank.
Well, you'd think so, which is why that's essentially already mandated:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Information_Security_Ma...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Information_Processing_...
Coming from the construction industry, there isn't a contractor in the world that cares about things which aren't in the contract. Implementing features which the client has not asked for, in the design-bid-build world of public-sector contracting, just means you will lose the bid to a lower bidder who won't do those extras.