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A comment on Why Android SSL was downgraded from AES256-SHA to RC4-MD5 in late 2010. Parent comment

Re:Why Android SSL was downgraded from AES256-SHA to RC4-MD5... by Eiwatah4 on Monday October 14, 2013 @02:31PM (#6548799)
Afaik, as long as a weak cipher is enabled on both client and server, a MITM attacker can force it to be used. It involves manipulating the handshake to tell both parties the other one doesn't support any better cipher.
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Re:Why Android SSL was downgraded from AES256-SHA to RC4-MD5... by xnyhps on Monday October 14, 2013 @02:44PM (#6548872)
Eh, no. Maybe in SSLv2, but the first thing TLS encrypts is a hash of the entire handshake. Modifying the cipher list would change those hashes into something different.

Unless you have a client which will happily disable a cipher and try again when encountering an error. But if you do that, you don't deserve any security.

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