You should be clearer with your recommendation. If you can relax the constraint that the protocol has to work between strangers, then SSL offers functionality you don't need, and the actual interface to SSL has moving parts that might hurt you.
I specifically mentioned client-server applications, didn't I? If you are handing out client code which talks to a server you run, you don't need the protocol to work between strangers.
Except for the part where you hand out the code and the certificate.
You need a secure way of handing out client code, sure. There's no way to get around that. But once you've figured out how to do that, you might as well include the server public key.
If an attacker can mangle the server public key which you're distributing with the client code, they can mangle the client code, at which point you've already lost.
So you draw an imaginary line around the parts of your application that have simple security requirements, make recommendations about the stuff inside the lines, ignore the stuff outside the lines, and berate the technologies that deal with the stuff outside the lines.
Just so we're clear.
You should be clearer with your recommendation. If you can relax the constraint that the protocol has to work between strangers, then SSL offers functionality you don't need, and the actual interface to SSL has moving parts that might hurt you.
Most people who build crypto can't relax that constraint, even if they think they can. We've beat several schemes that relied on pre-distributed public keys because of the out-of-band channels that wound up getting grafted on to bring new members into the group.
Finally, verifying a certificate chain isn't hard. It's constructing a verifiable certificate chain in the first place that has proven difficult. If IE7 didn't offer the "bad certificate" click-through warning, and simply failed the request, we'd be discussing the right problem instead of the red herring.